wise use of mires and peatlands - Peatland Ecology Research Group

114 VALUES AND CONFLICTS: WHERE DIFFERENT VALUES MEETcentrism, and biocentrism 155 do not achievethat. Wherever a logical relationship betweena moral consideration and some empiricalquality has been claimed, a naturalisticfallacy 1561 is always involved. And whereverthe claim is based solely on plausibility, theevidence appears to be arbitrary. Anecocentric, holistic position appears to be theonly logical conclusion.In practice, the differences with a (nonegoistic)anthropocentric position appear tobe not so much in the fundamentally differenttypes of conflicts, but rather in the much largernumber of conflicts to which such holisticethic leads. Regarding the way human beingshave to deal with nature in general, Gorkeadvocates with Albert Schweitzer thatharming other entities always involves asmaller or larger quantity of guilt, dependingon how necessary the intervention is. Thismeans that for evaluating environmentalconflicts, an ethical “black/white” approach(allowed/forbidden) should be replaced by agraduated concept (the less harm thebetter) 157 .1Cf. §1.2.2“The assignment of weights is an essential andnot a minor part of a concept of justice. If wecannot explain how these weights are to bedetermined by reasonable ethical criteria, themeans of rational discussion have come to anend. An intuitionist conception of justice is, onemight say, but half of a conception. We should dowhat we can to formulate explicit principles forthe priority problem, even though the dependenceof intuition cannot be eliminated entirely.” Rawls1971.3See Brennan 1992, and below.4Cf. Rawls 1971, Taylor 1986, Attfield & Dell1996. See also §3.2.5Hardin 1968.6Following the Universal Declaration of HumanRights (UN General Assembly 1948) and theconcept of sustainable development (WorldCommission on Environment and Development1987), cf. §3.2. While the framework in thisdocument is based on an anthropocentricposition, it nontheless recognises (§§ 3.2, 4.10and 5.8) that many people believe in the moralright of animals, plants, ecosystems andlandscapes to exist, i.e. that these entities haveintrinsic value.7Frank 1985, 1999.8Satisfaction of needs is the removal of shortage,satisfaction of wants is the removal ofdissatisfaction.9Science Action Coalition & Fritsch 1980. Humanbeings share this characteristic with many otheranimal species. The display of affluence functionsas an indication of good prospects for thesuccessful raising of offspring, and attractspotential reproduction partners. Once thismechanism functions, competition for matingrapidly results in the evolution of exaggeratedforms, as is shown by peacock tails, large antlers,fat bellies, even to the extent that the initialadvantage changes into a disadvantage (e.g. giantdeer).10Cf. the “trickle-down-effect” of Simmel 1905.This inclination is actively exploited bycommerce by creating trends and ridiculing peoplewho do not follow them (Mishan 1967).11At relatively high levels of income, personalhappiness depends on one’s income orexpenditure relative to the mean income orexpenditure of some reference group. At reallylow levels of income happiness is not associatedwith income (Gupta 1999).12Achterhuis 1988.13Increased information exchange in the “globalvillage” has on the one hand enormously enlargedthe circle of reference for mimetical desire(everyone in the world can know what everyoneelse possesses). On the other hand it has removedthe spatial obstacles for group formation, makingpossible - more than in the past - the free choiceof social surroundings.14A villa, for example, satisfies the basic need forshelter, but additionally satisfies many “wants”.The same applies to food, drink, clothing, healthcare, social contacts etc.15Rawls 1971. If, for example, the only way tosave the life of five patients is to kill an innocentperson and divide his/her organs among them bytransplantation, the killing is wrong even though,by saving five lives at the expense of one, it hasoverall “better” consequences. Saving life is not“equivalent” to killing (Harris 1975, Hurka 1993,Prior 1998).16I.e. that do not violate the rights of others.17It should be noted that the concept of HumanRights is essentially an individualistic approach.In other societies more “holistic” approaches(see §3.2) may prevail, that pay more attentionto the societal “whole” and less to the individualsconstituting that whole. The caste system inancient Hindu society, for example, ecologicallystabilised society by reducing competition amongvarious people for limited natural resources(Dwivedi 1990).18Cf. “Live simply that others may simply live”,Salleh 1990.19Rubus chamaemorus20A precedence is a measure of importance in spacewithin the same value category (e.g. finding “me”