2010 ilerleme raporu - Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı

finances. But the earmarked funds of €500 million were underutilised, as only seven SMEshad received credit guarantee support by 31 March 2010. The large informal sector which isfuelled by weaknesses in tax and expenditure policies, as well as in law enforcement, remainsan important challenge. Turkey therefore adopted a comprehensive action plan to combat theinformal economy in 2009. Overall, the crisis slowed down or even reversed structural shiftsin economic activity. In spite of new initiatives by the Turkish government, the crisis hascomplicated access to finance for SMEs.State influence on competitivenessThere has been no tangible progress in the field of state aid. As transparency in the decisionmakingprocess remains low, it is still difficult to judge the rationale and consistency of theindividual decisions taken. In addition, the scale of state aid and its importance in some keysectors are likely to have increased substantially following the introduction of the variousfiscal stimulus packages. Adoption of the commercial code has again been postponed. Theabsence of transparent monitoring of state aid and of supporting policies to reduce distortioncontinued to have an adverse effect on competition and competitiveness in the economy.Public procurement policies continued to be undermined by exceptions to the regulatoryframework. Overall, state intervention continued to be untransparent, which might have had anegative effect on competition and competitiveness.Economic integration with the EUThe openness of the Turkish economy, as measured by the total value of exports of goods andservices as a percentage of GDP, decreased to about 47.5% of GDP by the end of 2009, from52.2% in 2008, largely in line with the crisis-led contraction in world trade. The EU’s share ofTurkey’s total trade increased from 41.4% in 2008 to 42.6% in 2009. Its share in Turkey’sexports decreased from 48% in 2008 to 46% in 2009. While the EU’s share of Turkey’s tradevaries slightly from year to year, depending on numerous factors, including commodity pricetrends and exchange rate movements, its decline in Turkey’s exports is likely to be the resultof relatively more subdued demand in the EU. Simultaneously, Turkey was somehow able todiversify its exports towards other regions. The share of exports to African and Middle Eastcountries in Turkey’s total exports increased from 10% in 2008 to over 20% in 2009. FDIinflows to Turkey from EU Member States remained very significant, growing from 75% ofthe total in 2008 to 80% in 2009, thus illustrating the strong economic interdependencebetween the EU and Turkey. Overall, trade and economic integration with the EU remainedhigh. Turkey was able to diversify part of its trade towards new markets, thereby partlyalleviating the impact of the crisis.Incipient nominal exchange rate appreciation pressures were observed in the first half of2010. In the year to July 2010, the exchange rate for the lira appreciated by 5% in nominalterms against a basket of 50% US dollar and 50% euro. In real effective terms, corrected forboth producer and consumer price developments, the lira strengthened by 8%. Overall,standard indicators suggest that Turkey’s export competitiveness has stopped improving.4. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIPThis section examines Turkey's ability to assume the obligations of membership – that is, theacquis as expressed in the Treaties, the secondary legislation and the policies of the Union. Italso analyses Turkey's administrative capacity to implement the acquis. The analysis isstructured in accordance with the list of 33 acquis chapters. In each sector, the Commission'sEN 44 EN