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172. German Counter-intelligence Organization of the GBA?The negligible results produced by the GBAF organization led to theestablishment of a counter-intelligence network created specifically toassist forcible impressment. This constituted the followingorganizat ions:­(1) Sehutzkorpa (SE)(The "Schutzkorps" here mentioned is not to be confused withSchutskorps comprising the Sohutzkommando units 1A OT). Created13 April 1944 the GBAF Sohutzkorps formed the counter-intelligence corpsproper* It consisted of a body of 600 men dressed in civilian clothesrIt was administratively subordinated to the 3D or Sloherheltsdienst(Security Service) HQ PARIS. The men were distributed amongst theFeldkommandanturen where they were controlled lay the local GBAF leaderwho received daily reports from the local SD office on the labour situationin the area* The men acted both as agents-provocateurs or as labourpropagandists, where the situation warranted*(2) Liga fttr Soziale Ordnung und Gerechti^ceit(League for Social Order and Justice)Created in May 1944, the Liga was the code name for a body of 3000collaborationist "recruiting agents" prepared to use effective methods indealing with obstinate cases* They were allotted to the Feldkommandanturenin detachments of 50 men*(3) Komi tee fttr Sozialen Frieden(Committee for Social Peace)Created in May 1944* the Remittee fQr Sozialen Frieden was thecode name for a collaborationist "recruiting agent" prepared to useeffective methods in dealing with obstinate oases* They were allotted tothe Feldkommandanturen in detachments of 50 men*(4) Komitee fttr Sozialen Frieden(Committee for Social Peace)Created in May 1944, the Komitee fttr Sozialen Frieden was the codename for a collaborationist auxiliary police corps of 5000 men placed underadministrative command of the Allgemeine SS* Its functions were:to make French authorities who had been carrying on a covert campaign ofsabotage "see the light"; to help carry through measures for the transferof workers to Germany, especially in respect to tracking down those absentwithout leave from German factories, etc*, and service dodgers; toreport on popular sentiment and the influence of enemy propaganda*In connection with the second of their functions they had receivedSADGKEL's written instructions to permit convoys on their way to Germany tosing the "Marseillaise" or the "Internationale" or for that matter anyanti-Nazi song until they arrived in Germany, at. which time "they wouldbe taught to sing a different song very quickly"*The* authorities of the latter two bodies were co-ordinated byOberregie rungs rat MEINCKLE. In fact they were commonly regarded asforming one organization, called Komitee und Liga* An initialappropriation of 3 million KM was set aside as an expense fund* Out of it,amongst other expenses, premiums were paid for every prospect brought in:10 Btf for unskilled workers and 20 RM for skilled workers*173* ConclusionAside from the fact that Germany was losing the war and as a consequence,resistance in Occupied Europe was stiffening in proportion to Germany's needfor collaboration the two key factors which caused labour conscriptionfor Germany's benefit to bog down*in France at the time of her greatest needwere the French prefects of the Departments and the British radio propaganda*