Compilation Vol 3 Corrected (1-943).pmd - Goa Public Service ...

548
he renders 10 years of service in that category which came into existence on September
9, 1966, and this would apply mutatis mutandis to the Specialists’ Grade Officers who
must put in 8 years of service in the category which came into existence on September 9,
1966. If this contention were to prevail, apart from anything else, Appellant himself
would not have been qualified for promotion to super-time Grade-II in February, 1971
from which date he claims as being eligible for promotion to super-time Grade-II because
he had not put in 8 years of service in the category of Specialists’ Grade Officers formed
on September 9, 1966. That apart, it is impossible to overlook the history of the service.
The Rules were initially framed in 1963. At that time the service was sought to be classified
in five categories styled category “A” to Category “E”. Expression ‘category’ in 1963
Rules was defined to mean a group of posts carrying the same scale of pay. Another
salient feature of which notice should be taken is that save and except upward revision in
scale, category-I under the 1966 Amendment Rules includes Categories “A” and “B”
under 1963 Rules……It is a well recognized cannon of construction that the construction
which makes the rule otiose or unworkable should be avoided where two constructions
are possible and the court should lean in favour of the construction which would make the
Rule workable and further the purpose for which the Rule is intended. …”
(2) THE MARTIN BRUN LTD v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA - AIR 1966 SC
529, (para 14):
“We can now deal with the reasoning on which the High Court in the present case justified
the order of remand. It realized that by making the order it was depriving the appellant of
one of the chances to object to the valuation, namely the chance under S.139, but it felt
that by upholding that right of the appellant it would be depriving the Corporation of its
rates wholly as the time limit prescribed by S.131(2) (b) had expired. It thought that it
was faced with two evils and that it would be choosing the lesser of the two, if it allowed
the Corporation a chance to collect the rates. With great respect, we find this line of
reasoning altogether unsupportable. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never
an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether
a Court likes the result or not. When the High Court found that S.131(2)(b) had been
attracted to the case, it had no power to set that provision at naught.”
(3) UCO BANK v. RAJINDER LAL CAPOOR - (2008) 5 SCC 237 (paras 26 to 28):
“26. It is now a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the court must give
effect to the purport and object of the Act. Rule of purposive construction should, subject
of course to the applicability of the other principles of interpretation be made applicable
in a case of this nature.
27. In NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. NUSLI NEVILLE WADIA, this Court held
(SCC pp.296-97 paras 51-54):
Karnataka PSC
‘51(50). …With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner,
we are of the opinion that liberal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or
absurdity which must be availed. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in