The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

100 Chapter 4
Cameo appearances of famous Marines are peppered throughout but do not
dominate the story line. Teamwork—moving as a unit, training, patrolling,
and even socializing in brotherhoods—is the consistent image throughout.
An emphasis on teamwork is not surprising coming from the Marine
Corps. Far more surprising, especially for those who have been socialized to
regard being called “individual” as insult, is the emphasis in commandants’
speeches on “the individual Marine.” Commandants do speak of brotherhood
but more often of the individual Marine. From Thomas Holcomb
in 1943: “The emphasis still is on the individual. As always, each man is
trained just as if the outcome of the entire war depends on his personal
success—as indeed it does to a higher degree than he is likely to realize.” 86
David M. Shoup in the run- up to Vietnam: “The Marine Corps continues
to emphasize the importance of the small unit leader and the individual
Marine. Success in battle ultimately depends on them.” 87 And Leonard F.
Chapman Jr. in the thick of it: “[Chapman’s] summation of this first trip to
Vietnam as CMC [commandant of the Marine Corps] (‘But not my last’)
is an even firmer conviction that the key to successful Corps operations in
Vietnam rests solely with the individual Marine.” 88
The paradox is made sensible when context and repetition reveal that
the commandants’ concern is nothing like the American cultural notion of
“individual”—a focus on personal needs and rights—but rather a concern
for the excellent craftsmanship, fine- tuning, and careful maintenance of an
individual weapon. The Marine is a weapon. In this, the paradox is undone,
and the prose becomes a natural fit with leatherneck culture. The “transformation”
glamorized by Marine Corps advertising is a promise that the
Corps will take untried, somewhat ordinary human material and transform
it into a state- of- the- art lethal weapon. Recruits expect this of the Corps.
At the end of their training, they want to stand with fellow Devil Dogs Col.
Norman L. Cooling and Lt. Col. Roger B. Turner and say, “The principle
[sic] weapon system aboard an amphibious ship is not the main battery or
the aviation squadron—it is the Marine.” 89
Combat Prowess
Weaponizing Marines comes with its own set of norms cultivated across
the institutional history of the Marine Corps. The concept that dominates
Marine identity, that theirs is “the finest fighting institution in the world,” 90
manned with “fighters who are ready, willing, and able to win,” 91 is married
to a set of practices aimed at making that claim a reality. Unpacking
the norms and values that attend the Marine brand of fighting and what
they perceive as the fighting characteristics that “win” is essential to understanding
their combat practices and how these might suit in a counterinsurgency
environment. The Marine- as- fighter persona is reinforced in even the