The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Bounding the Possible 39
History has given Americans good reason to believe that well- meaning
political administrations may lack an informed foundation on the risks, possible
humiliation, and other large- scale costs of irregular wars. From the
Philippines to the Banana Wars to Vietnam and then Afghanistan and Iraq,
US policymakers did not foresee the protracted nature of the counterinsurgency
and nation- building enterprises on which they were embarking and
therefore supplied little by way of direction or advanced planning to the
military forces sent to engage in them.
The frustrations born of poorly executed counterinsurgencies have historically
led to denial. The event of the Vietnam War, for instance, was perceived
by both the military and the nation as an aberration and, like other
irregular conflicts, “outside the scope of American political- military policy.” 6
Denial has consequences. Eliot Cohen argues that Americans compound
their own counterinsurgency conundrum by “simply refusing to believe
that they will again send soldiers into obscure corners of the world to fight
for limited political objectives against a hostile non- European power.” The
consequence of this mind- set is a state of chronic underpreparedness when
faced with the next round. 7
A number of factors may explain Americans’ aversion to, failure to plan
for, and at least initial stumbling within counterinsurgency settings. One
that nearly ensures costly and repeated mistakes is “a cultivated ignorance
of other nations,” 8 combined with a debilitating proclivity for ahistoricism. 9
Samuel Huntington argued in 1957 that American indifference to international
affairs was a natural repercussion of American- style liberalism, which
had deeply and homogeneously rooted itself in the nation. Liberalism in
America did not incorporate any coherent philosophy vis- à- vis foreign
affairs, leaving Americans only domestic solutions for international problems.
10 Oliver Lee argues that this trend has continued, undiminished, in the
decades since Huntington wrote. American insularity is a repercussion of an
“extraordinary degree of individualism” in American culture, which compels
the American people to focus “their concerns and energies upon advancing
the interests of the individual and his or her family and perhaps their local
community, and to some extent of the nationwide community, but [demonstrate]
little interest in or concern about the wide world beyond. . . .” 11
This knowledge gap about the outside world, however, does not inhibit
Americans from possessing strong opinions about it. 12 Unsurprisingly, this
often leads to offensive behavior, born more of ignorance than malice. 13
American leadership is not required by its public to demonstrate a
significantly more refined grasp of the world. Civilian policymakers and
elected officials are rarely punished for manifesting a limited sense of history
or analytic capability. 14 A premium is placed on experience- based common
sense and forward- looking ambition. 15 Revered American icon Henry Ford
is reported to have said, “History is more or less bunk. It’s tradition. We
don’t want tradition. We want to live in the present and the only history