The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

242 Chapter 9
west. Everyone knew the United States Marine Corps comprised
the strongest tribe—especially Iraqis, not just other US military
branches. The USMC’s olive- branch outreach and strategic shift
toward Anbar tribes had started in 2004, when US civilian leaders
in Baghdad and Washington showed little to no interest. I had been
around since then, so I knew the details well beyond the Power
Point slides. 126
Weston concurs that a constellation of factors were required in making the
timing right for the set of counterinsurgency practices that Marines eventually
applied. Primary in that constellation was a pragmatism born of a bruising
and fruitless cycle of violence that neither the US nor Sunni side could
break without conceding in important ways. Weston described the dynamic
that dominated Anbar from 2004 to 2007 as “USMC versus IED.” 127 To
extract themselves from this cycle, Americans had to rethink cherished
notions concerning the “right” structures in Iraqi society to amplify with
coercive power, and tribal sheikhs had to make peace with a lineup of missteps
and humiliations suffered at American hands. A willingness to do so
on both sides took some bloody years in the making.
Marine notions concerning “right” and “legitimate” structures of power
were informed by long-standing Western and American perceptions concerning
just governance and assumptions about the natural progression of
human civilizations toward Western structures of democracy. Tribes in the
Anbar region tried a number of times to reach out to Marines, asking for
their support in reclaiming weapons and ammunition and in acquiring vehicles
in order to defend their territory and engage in a serious fight against
al- Qaeda. These initial overtures were rebuffed by both American civilian
leaders and the Marines carrying out their political mandate. The overwhelming
priority for American civil and military forces in Iraq was to support
the legitimacy and empowerment of the newly constructed government
in Baghdad. 128 Arming and supporting the tribes was perceived as a primitive
and antidemocratic move, one that would undermine efforts to stabilize
Iraq as a functioning, modernizing democracy. During the early years in
Iraq, Marines urged the tribes to support the national government by sending
their sons to the Iraqi Army. 129 Only after two years of costly stalemate
were Marines willing to break with what they continued to believe was
a “right” and superior strategy: supporting an elected, Western- style government,
effectual or not. Even after allying with the tribes in a successful
partnership that made real and measurable gains against insurgents, Marine
officers were careful to admonish caution about the practice:
Don’t forget the big picture. When it comes to dealing with the
tribes, you can’t sell yourself all the way on them. You have to
remember that there’s an elected government, there’s a legitimate