The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Setting the Stage 167
The senior Marine officers who encouraged the development and
growth of the CAP program understood the need for careful selection of
CAP Marines. The CAP screening process was designed with high standards
in mind but was not applied with consistency in practice. In its ideal form,
Marines who were selected for the program had volunteered for it and also
came highly recommended by a commanding officer. These Marines had
strong marks in conduct and proficiency, had been in-country for at least
two months but had at least six months remaining, were interested in living
and working with the Vietnamese people, were exceptionally mature,
had not been wounded more than once, and were high school graduates. 153
In practice, the selection process was rather haphazard. In some eras and
regions, Marines coming in were tightly and systematically screened. 154 In
other cases, Marines were “volunteered” out of their units because they
were not liked by their commanders and the commanders knew or cared
little about the CAP program—a “cleaning out the trash” approach. 155 Some
Marines volunteered out of line units not because they were interested in
CAP service, but rather because they misperceived it as an opportunity to
get out of the line of fire. 156
When it became difficult to find infantry Marines with the proper
mentality—too many had seen too much action and had been hardened
against the Vietnamese—the CAP program started pulling Marines from
rear- echelon duties or assigning them directly to CAP duty from training
in the States. 157 The patchy selection process was listed as a key shortcoming
by Francis T. McNamara, a Foreign Service officer serving as a political
adviser to the US military, who systematically reviewed the program in
1970. Interestingly enough, his concerns focused on the resultant youth and
lack of combat experience of squad leaders—an opinion seconded by CAP
Marines—rather than issues of ethnocentrism or underdeveloped people
skills. 158 He also recommended a return to voluntary service from among
Marine ranks for the program rather than the direct- assignment approach,
since the predominantly volunteer era seemed to exhibit higher degrees of
enthusiasm for the CAP program’s population- oriented principles. 159
Regardless of military occupational specialty or eventual designation
to the CAP, Marines were all trained in the same Marine boot- camp style.
Once assigned to a CAP, these Marines would continue to lean heavily on
their infantry training but needed some “retooling” in mind- set for the
program. At its best, the CAP program offered its Marines additional incountry
training on Vietnamese language and customs at a special CAP
school for three to four weeks. Marines had diverse reactions to this effort.
Some proved resistant, 160 while others noted the value of this brief training
and advocated for significantly more. 161 The value of understanding local
culture and receiving adequate linguistic training is probably the subject
that receives the most lip service and least practice across historical Marine
Corps lessons recognized. 162 The need for cultural competence is a lesson