The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

258 Conclusion
Bing West observed this mind- set in action in 2005, noting that the US
military’s “can- do spirit” created immense pressure for positive reporting on
the state of training provided for indigenous troops. Thus, a country- wide
review of progress made during that period received only positive reports.
The prevailing feedback was that training Iraqi forces to self- sufficiency
could be accomplished within twelve months—an estimate West categorized
as “dizzying optimism.” 3 The US military’s approach is a reflection of an
admirable trait and one the Marines prize above all else: taking responsibility
for the mission and seeing it through. That same trait, however, creates
a perennial blind spot by eclipsing from serious consideration those factors
that are outside Marine control. Rather than assume that the will to fight
can be inspired through training, military planners are better served by a
hard- nosed evaluation of the incentives present for locals to fight alongside
them and an equally rigorous evaluation of which incentives the United
States is in a position to alter.
West’s one- on- one conversations with commanders yielded more candid
assessments than the reports they made to “higher.” Officers were frustrated
with the caliber of recruits they were given, the lack of discipline,
motivation, and capacity for leadership on the part of Iraqi officers, and
insufficient material support from Baghdad. 4 Many of these concerns melted
away once tribes, motivated on their own terms, began sending recruits to
join the fight. With a common enemy in their sights and strong incentives on
both sides to coordinate efforts, frustration on the American side eased, and
partnership with the increased number of higher- caliber recruits produced
rapid successes.
The will to fight alongside American forces, more so than the high
quality of training offered by US Marines, determines the existence of an
effective and reliable indigenous partner for counterinsurgency operations.
Pecuniary rewards are inadequate, as shown by the low quality of recruits
who responded to this incentive during the Banana Wars, and so is the
opportunity for excellent martial training, as evidenced in Iraq. The efforts
of local recruits can be amplified exponentially by US training and resources
when the American cause is one that they, of their own accord, judge worth
fighting for. Only when this essential factor is in play do the counterinsurgency
best practices of living, eating, sleeping beside, and training with
indigenous partners make a real difference.
Intelligence
Intelligence was relatively weak during the Banana Wars, significantly
improved on during the CAP program, and advanced further during the
Corps’s time in Iraq. Marines never remedied serious intelligence deficits
while operating in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or Nicaragua. Bad