The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Counterinsurgency in Iraq 221
the “three- block war.” It is an environment born of change and
adaptability. It will also be an age born of advanced technology and
weapons that are readily available to friend and foe alike. 7
The strategic corporal concept was also formed in anticipation of
future irregular war. Krulak foresaw that the outcome of future operations,
“whether humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or traditional warfighting,”
would be significantly impacted by the decisions of small- unit leaders
operating far from the flagpole. These Marines would be required to deal
with “a bewildering array of challenges and threats,” which would require
maturity and good judgment, often under extreme duress. Their decisions,
subjected to “the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public
opinion” had the potential to impact not only the immediate tactical situation,
but operational and strategic outcomes as well. 8
As Krulak’s predictions of three- block warfare came to pass in Iraq,
Marines seized on the concept as prophetic and referenced it in order to
ground their efforts in Marine identity and practice. Although the threeblock-
war concept had not translated into significant shifts in predeployment
training and doctrine, it did allow Marine officers a service- specific
optic for making sense of the complex task set in front of them and, perhaps
more important, acted as a predesignated signal from the top that the current
blend of humanitarian and kinetic tasks endemic to counterinsurgency
were, in fact, authentic Marine Corps business. In this spirit, officers reporting
back from the field during the first months in Iraq praised the switching
of roles adopted by their troops as in line with the commandant’s prescient
vision. Describing the successful transition made by his Marines from the
heavy aggression of mechanized war to pacification and stabilization efforts
in Iraq’s towns and villages during their first deployment in 2003, Brig. Gen.
John F. Kelly reported back with pride that “this was Gen Charles C. Krulak’s
‘three block war,’ and the Marines understood it and performed as if
they were born to it.” 9 Writing in 2004, a 1st Lieutenant Tsirlis affirmed,
“Operations in Iraq are small unit fights for which our Marines are uniquely
prepared. Former Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Charles C. Krulak’s
‘three block war’ concept has unfolded before our eyes. The ‘strategic
corporal’ is in effect.” In the same breath that he cited these concepts, he
acknowledged that any attendant skill set “received only a cursory level
of instruction during The Basic School.” Nevertheless, crediting a heritage
drawn from the CAP program, as well as support and wisdom from the
then- current division leadership of Gen. Jim Mattis, he summed up his confidence
in the capacity of the Marine Corps to triumph in asymmetrical
conflict: “The Marine Corps is uniquely suited for this type of warfare. Our
illustrious history shows this to be true.” 10
General Mattis is often credited with pushing innovative counterinsurgency
doctrine within the Corps. He is widely considered to be an