The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

262 Conclusion
and reward this skill: “If these so- called soft sciences [sociology, anthropology,
ethnography, and psychology] are the art that complements the science
in ‘military science,’ the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 50- pound brain is
lopsided, with 49 pounds in the left hemisphere of the brain and focused on
the sciences of kinetic warfare (ballistics, hydro- and aerospace engineering,
etc.) and 1 pound in the other hemisphere genuinely focused on civil populations
and the indices of instability.” 25 The reward system and clear hierarchy
of the Corps means that aptitude in dissecting the sociocultural aspects of
war will remain an undercelebrated aspect of the warfighter personality. The
persistent result is that a number of current officers ignore available culturerelated
education and make needless mistakes as a consequence. 26
While a recalcitrant bunch will likely always be in the mix across US
services and cross- cultural competence is not likely to displace combat valor
any time soon on the Corps’s altar of worship, it would be wrong to discount
the unmatched steps forward made in cultural education within the
most recent counterinsurgency era. 27 They represent an integration level that
moves beyond that of a simple lesson recognized. Sustaining forward momentum
toward refinement and institutionalization is the challenge ahead. Scholars
involved with this effort worry that the aspects of cultural education
and training likely to persist will be those of least utility to the Corps. The
Department of Defense is most comfortable with a regional studies approach
to cultural education—one that will fall short for all wars outside the regions
selected. A superior educational method, found in modest form within the
current Corps’s officer curricula, emphasizes universal decoding skills. Called
a “culture- general” approach, this method focuses on the concepts and skills
that help Marines identify and understand the information necessary to navigate
diverse cultures wherever they are deployed. Without the expansion of
culture- general education, future Marines will find themselves ill- prepared
for fights in unexpected theaters. Anticipating that likely end, experts hope
to keep little pieces of the culture- general capability tucked away—a set of
“tiny pilot lights” burning in corners of the military services over the next ten
years. They predict that these will either receive a burst of fuel from another
round of population- centric conflicts or eventually burn out. If the latter, the
Corps will once again be left to rely on its signature norm of adaptability in
place of appropriately focused education regimens. 28
Lessons Not to Lose
Not all lessons that might be learned from the experience in Iraq have
received the attention they merit. The staying power of counterinsurgency
itself, as a particular war discipline, does not seem to be faring well within
Marine Corps classrooms. Some officers who earned their stripes in counterinsurgency
fights across the last decades worry that the lessons from