The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

164 Chapter 6
(a refusal to see clearly the mistakes of one’s own group as causal in the
unhelpfulness of locals)—prevented Marines from addressing this problem
in a way that may have reversed some of the strategic backlash and
helped them cultivate a more fruitful intelligence relationship with residents
in the know. Instead of engaging in critical introspective analysis, Marines
blamed negative relations with indigenous populations on the “gullibility
and ignorance” of the population, which was exploited by agitators, the
local press, 135 or “so- called Americans who under one pretext or another
will assist in originating and spreading tales of alleged ‘atrocities’ said to
have been committed by our troops.” 136 The Marines’ refusal to acknowledge
their own culpability may be due, in part, to their perception that their
own abuses paled in comparison to the extensive abuses meted out by peer
European powers on indigenous populations. 137 Although this may have
been true, their comparatively restrained level of abuse was still sufficient to
incur the ire and even hatred of members of the population. 138 The fact that
this was modest in proportion to global standard was likely a benefit lost on
those who suffered it.
Looking back on these experiences, the Small Wars Manual authors
hoped to construct doctrine that would turn the situation around. Their
verbiage indicates optimism in fostering a different sort of intelligence relationship
with locals in the future, based on an improved “attitude adopted
toward the loyal and neutral population” but without abandoning the prospect
of coercion: “The natives must be made to realize the seriousness of
withholding information, but at the same time they must be protected from
terrorism.” 139 Whatever intelligence wisdom was gained in the process of
prosecuting the three Banana Wars and ruling Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, it came too late in those theaters to have an effect. The fact that
in all three cases Marines had to use means other than sound, volunteered
intelligence to locate the enemy—using their own small patrols as bait to
draw out the enemy, systematically canvassing large areas with constant
patrolling, or surveying the landscape by air—indicates that their intelligence
rapport with the population remained poor. 140
Hostility between Marines and the indigenous populations ensured
that they would eventually be driven from each country and that the
national narrative concerning their experience there would be a negative
one. More important for Marines, the negative narrative would play
in their home country. The American population soured on the Marine
interventions, not because Marines failed to “get bandits,” but because
of national shame regarding the treatment of locals. As early as 1922, the
pages of the Gazette were acknowledging the repercussions. Lieutenant
Kilmartin, the same who dubbed assaulting a citizen of the Dominican
Republic a “small matter,” used love and loyalty to the Corps and the
strong dedication to not tarnish its image in an attempt to inspire good
behavior toward indigenous citizens: