The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

38 Chapter 2
general accord with the norms of society. Thus, society’s values must be
reflected in military professional ethics and behavior, even on the battlefield.”
Sarkesian is careful to point out that this general rule may be bent on
occasion—sometimes for expediency and sometimes because, where counterinsurgencies
are concerned, “the conflict touches such a small segment of
the American people” that they simply fail to notice. 1
It must be noted that despite the heavy cultural interconnectedness
between a nation and its armed forces, the military services see as part of
their purpose the crafting of new men and new women—an honorable warrior
breed fit for engagement in the business of war. This process, by design,
includes a breaking down of former civilian identities and habits and a
transformative rebuilding of a capable military class in its place. The Marine
Corps prides itself on a transformation more complete than that of any of
the other services. The result is a distinctive subculture that runs counter
to some aspects of national culture, including, in some cases, the strategic
culture preferred by the public as a whole. 2 The following sections capture
in brief form particularly salient aspects of American national culture and
US military culture when assessing impact on counterinsurgency practice.
American National Culture
The US military is its own cultural incubator—the individual services even
more so—but with members drawn from an already heavily encultured
national population: one reared in a democratic setting that prizes individual
worth, justice, and fair play and celebrates the American exceptionalism
captured within the American dream—individualism, equal opportunity,
and the right to pursue happiness. 3 These laudable American traits come
packaged with others, some that have potential to serve well in small- wars
engagements and others that do not.
Jeffrey Record argues that there are two key weaknesses in American
culture where waging successful counterinsurgency is concerned. The first
is “the American tendency to separate war and politics—to view military
victory as an end in itself, ignoring war’s function as an instrument of
policy.” The second is a flat- out aversion to counterinsurgency. 4 This aversion
is not wholly attributable to the type of fighting itself but is due, at
least in part, to a lack of confidence in the fights selected. James Warren
points out that many thoughtful Americans are aware of US counterinsurgency
successes but doubt the judgment of policymakers in steering the
effective application of military force. Worried about mission creep and
“the pursuit of lofty generalities such as ‘the expansion of democracy and
freedom’” in places that seem inhospitable to it, Americans “recoil from
the deployment of ground forces far more than they do the use of air or
sea- launched cruise missiles.” 5