The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

126 Chapter 5
protest. This authority has proven critical to the ability of the contemporary
Marine Corps to adapt to asymmetric threats. Commandants have often
served as the ultimate champion of maverick or revolutionary ideas.” 56
Marine leadership recognizes that the trust it demands and socializes
into new Marines is a precious commodity. Doctrine emphasizes the path
Major Waller exhibited in attaining trust: “Only by their physical presence—by
demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation—can
commanders fully gain the trust and confidence of subordinates.” 57 Trust in
leadership is the requisite good for inspiring combat effectiveness in fighting
men. “Leaders should develop unit cohesion and esprit and the self- confidence
of individuals within the unit. In this environment, a Marine’s unwillingness
to violate the respect and trust of peers can overcome personal fear.” 58
Not all leaders measure up. Examples of outrageously poor leadership
(of the sort typically kept from public view) and its repercussions for
Marines are portrayed with painful accuracy in the popular war memoir
turned television series Generation Kill. 59 A Marine blogger hosted by Tom
Ricks on the Foreign Policy website expressed his own frustration at belonging
to an “elite” organization that refused to clean house:
I’m talking about the Field Grade Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan
who didn’t know who Mullah Omar was. I’m talking about
a senior Staff NCO in the intelligence community who could not
produce a legible paragraph. I’m talking about a Battalion Commander
who took pride in the fact that he had done zero research
on Afghanistan, because it allowed him to approach his deployment
with “an open mind.” . . . The problem is not so much that these
individuals pop up every now and then, as every organization has
its bad eggs, but rather that we see them passed on through the system,
promoted and rewarded. If we are truly the elite organization
we claim to be, how do we justify the fact that we allow these individuals
to retain positions of immense influence, much less promote
through the ranks? How do we justify this endemic tolerance for
mediocrity or outright incompetence? 60
Uneven talent in the leadership pool poses a risk for the second tenet of
Marine Corps leadership: an ethos of distributing leadership to junior levels.
Even in the wake of the discipline problems endemic to the Vietnam War,
Commandant Robert E. Cushman Jr. argued, “Train them; back them up;
Let them lead; and Make them lead.” 61 Cushman’s admonition is the essence
of Mission Command as captured in today’s Marine Operating Concepts:
Rooted in service culture and fundamental to our warrior spirit,
Mission Command is a cultivated leadership ethos that empowers
decentralized leaders with decision authority and guides the