The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Know Thyself 21
As noted earlier in the chapter, any culture of substantial complexity
possesses internal contradictions, multiple narratives, and sometimes an
evolutionary history stretching over centuries. Assessing which aspects of
that cultural heritage matter now for this particular context on this particular
issue requires, first, a clear delineation of the issue itself. Cultural profiles
built without the focus of a particular security question are of limited utility
to operational planners.
A researcher need not remain married to the initial issue generated.
As she wades into the data collected, she may find that her framing of
the initial strategic issue needs narrowing (or widening). She may find
that a far more compelling question emerges. Looping back to refine and
restructure the initial problem set is not only welcome—it is recommended.
The subject matter of this book underwent just such a journey. The topic
initially selected for consideration was the character and success of stability
operations—those nonkinetic, state- building tasks often wrapped
into counterinsurgency operations—when performed by the US military.
Stability operations had captured the conscious attention of US defense
planners, and the result was unprecedented and exclusive treatment of the
subject in doctrinal form: Joint Doctrine JP 3- 0, the Army’s new Stability
Operations Field Manual: FM 3- 07. 29 This seemed to beg investigation. As
research progressed, however, it became increasingly clear that segregating
stability operations from the larger realm of counterinsurgency operations
would be an artificial distinction performed by the author and not
a defensible match with practice as it was performed by Marines across
their history of small- wars endeavors. Perhaps more important, historical
research revealed intriguing misfires between the strategic intentions of
nation- building efforts pursued by Marines alongside kinetic activity and
actual results. The interplay of Marine efforts on both fronts—captured in
the far more inclusive subject of comprehensive counterinsurgency operations—provides
a more compelling story than treating either kinetic efforts
or stability operations exclusively.
Select an Actor for Focused Study
If forecasting is improved by narrowing the focus to a particular issue, it
is further improved by narrowing analysis to a particular actor. Rather
than defaulting to the state- based approach favored by most authors writing
within the strategic culture paradigm, the mapping exercise assumes
that the actor selected for study ought to be determined by the players
relevant to the policy issue selected. The substate actor likely to have most
impact may shift considerably depending on the particular policy issue in
question. Most strategic culture work privileges elites as the key actor set
(whether at the national or organizational level) regardless of the issue at