The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Setting the Stage 147
follow- on from the Arias rebellion but rather a reaction to Marine moves
into the east, which threatened the station of local power brokers who
had traditionally posed a counterweight to the central government. 38 The
insurgency was hydra- headed in the extreme, led in sometimes competing
factions by multiple strongmen, and grew in strength as Marine activities
in the east inspired the ire of locals. Bruce Calder, author of the seminal
text on the Marine occupation from the Dominican perspective, points to
key deficits in the Marine perspective: “The marines long failed to comprehend
the nature either of their opponents or of the war they were fighting,”
which condemned them to “make the same mistakes again and again” and
kept them from controlling the eastern half of the republic. 39 The official
Corps history, looking back, seems to mourn the inability to morph the fight
into a conventional one: “Against Marine superiority in artillery, machine
guns, small- unit maneuver, and individual training and marksmanship, no
Dominican force could hold its ground. However, with too few men to cover
too much terrain, inadequate mounted or motorized forces, and often poor
communications, the Marines usually could not force the elusive enemy to
stand for a decisive battle.” 40
By the time Marines, along with their trained Dominican constabulary
and civilian recruits (“civil guard”), began to bring effective pressure to
bear on the insurgents, popular sentiment in both the Dominican Republic
and the United States to withdraw Marine forces had already achieved an
indignant critical mass. The public announcement of a Marine withdrawal
inspired insurgents to call a truce with the Marines closing in on them and
accept amnesty at the negotiating table by laying down arms. 41 Marines were
required in 1922 to transfer most functions of government to a provisional
Dominican administration and focus strictly on completing grand public
works projects and training Dominican leaders to take over the Guardia
Nacional. Pushed out by popular will, the last Marine departed Dominican
shores in 1924.
Within very few years, most endeavors in the Dominican sphere had
reverted to the 1916 standard. Politics were equally corrupt and personalitydriven,
the economy was beholden to the same few interests, health and education
improvements had proved unsustainable, and peasants rejected the
agricultural practices offered by US advisers in favor of traditional methods.
Two key changes remained, however. The national government, by virtue
of the Marines’ dismantlement of the strongman- based caudillo system,
became a much stronger and uncontested force in the lives of most Dominicans.
Improved roadways and communication lines aided the government’s
reach into previously insulated areas of the country. The Guardia Nacional,
trained by the Marines, proved capable of maintaining order. As head of
this service, Rafael Trujillo used it to spy internally, take over the reins of
government, and wield a dictatorship for thirty- one years. 42