The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

264 Conclusion
schoolhouses is the utility of studying counterinsurgency success stories in
context. Although leaders within Anbar pursued a somewhat similar repertoire
of counterinsurgency best practices, these were not prioritized in the
same way across cases or implemented in the same chronological order. In
some cases, Marines worked to forge key local relationships first and then
jointly pursued robust security operations alongside indigenous partners.
In other cases, Marines had to establish themselves as an effective security
presence by chalking up significant wins against al- Qaeda insurgents
before attempting meaningful relations with tribal leadership. In a few areas
Marines used multiple large- sweep operations in advance of setting up combat
outposts. In others, the strategy focused on using small combined teams
as “bait” in order to draw insurgents into the open. The larger lesson drawn
from these cases, then, is that best counterinsurgency practices must be contextually
assessed and determined through intimate familiarity with one’s
AO. An effective education of counterinsurgency practice, therefore, will
focus on close study of particular cases in order to understand the decisionmaking
process: how leaders decided which operational approach to prioritize
and pursue and why. This learning method will help reinforce Marine
values of adaptability and will validate their regard for doctrine as a general
source of guidance—a suggested repertoire of best practices—rather than a
set formula that restricts and overdirects small- unit action.
Thus, investing in the compilation and serious study of cases beyond
Alford’s in both Iraq and Afghanistan would go some distance in encouraging
flexible thinking and diminishing the temptation to draw the false
“lesson learned” of a universal formula for counterinsurgency. Marines do
little more than note Col. Sean MacFarland’s success in Ramadi in their
journals, for instance, and fail to analytically dissect the practices he and
Marine lieutenant colonel William Jurney, who served under him, put to
good use. A deep study of First Battalion, Sixth Marine Regiment’s tour in
Ramadi under Jurney would offer Marines proud ownership of innovation
practiced by one of their own, as well as make plain the diversity in successful
methods practiced across AOs. 32
Measuring Counterinsurgency Success
Despite the academic congratulations Alford received for his innovative
and sensible measure of stability in his area—the “eats on streets” count
of how many meals his Marines shared with local families—there is little
indication that this approach moved beyond a few pockets of operation
in Iraq or is likely to displace traditional, albeit often less useful, quantitative
assessment data. Across its history, the activities pursued by the
Marine Corps in irregular conflict have been largely shaped by American
metrics valuing countable and tangible achievements. The result has often