The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

84 Chapter 3
120. Ibid.
121. Lt. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, “Amphibious Miracle of Our Time,” Marine
Corps Gazette (October 1944): 3.
122. In Krulak’s accounting, this was born from an Army determination to “eliminate
forever its deficiencies in amphibious matters and its dependency on
Marines for amphibious expertise.” Krulak, First to Fight, 18.
123. Ibid., 51. See also James D. Hittle, “The Marine Corps and the National Security
Act,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1947).
124. “Summary of the Marine Corps Position,” Marine Corps Gazette (December
1949): 17.
125. Krulak, First to Fight, 58. For detailed accounts of the political machinations
that led to this moment, see ibid., 17–58, and O’Connell, Underdogs, 98–147.
126. Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., “Passing in Review,” Marine Corps Gazette
(April 1951): 62.
127. “Corps Standing Tall: Ready, Willing, Able,” Marine Corps Gazette (April
1961): 1.
128. Gen. Wallace M. Greene Jr., “Commandant’s Report,” Marine Corps Gazette
(May 1966): 21, 22, 25, 27.
129. Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr., “State of the Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette
(May 1969): 30.
130. Peterson, Combined Action Platoons, 18.
131. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., “Walking Tall,” Marine Corps Gazette (April
1975): 19.
132. USMC, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, 8.
133. The “do windows” reference is well understood and used with frequency
within Marine Corps circles. Capt. Chris Seiple does a particularly nice job
of capturing the many “other than war” tasks that doing windows comprises:
“Window into an Age of Windows: The U.S. Military and the NGOs,” Marine
Corps Gazette (April 1999): 63.
134. USMC, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, 8.
135. USMC, Marine Corps Operating Concepts, 1.
136. Ibid., 2 (italics in original).
137. USMC, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, 5, 8.
138. USMC, Marine Corps Operating Concepts, 8. See also Estes, Handbook for
Marine NCOs, 9.
139. Eliason, “Interview with James F. Amos,” 12–17.
140. Lt. Col. (Ret.) Frank G. Hoffman, “Posturing the Corps for the 21st Century,”
Marine Corps Gazette (December 2012): 28.
141. Ibid., 29. It is not military chiefs, however, but civilian masters who determine
which battles the nation fights—a point that seems to be missing from the Traditionalists’
analysis.
142. Hoffman cites the tone and substance of the Army’s Field Manual 3- 0, Operations,
as evidence and notes that many of the tenets of the Full Spectrum School
may also be found in USMC, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025.