The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

266 Conclusion
Marines in Iraq defaulted to many of the same patterns of measurement
that had been employed in prior engagements, with a primary focus on
insurgents killed and weapons found. As real progress began to be made in
Anbar, additional metrics were offered up, including the number of willing
recruits headed to American training and the volume of intelligence coming
from the population—both more reliable indicators of strategic progress. A
turn toward genuinely innovative metrics that can reliably measure strategic
progress will require an investment in creative qualitative analysis, which
can provide context for and extract meaning from the traditional pile of
quantitative data. The qualitative skill set required for this sort of analysis
remains underdeveloped across the force and runs counter to strong
American preferences for facts in the form of numbers- driven “hard data.” 38
Counting American inputs to the fight as achievements in their own right,
regardless of positive strategic impact, is a trend likely to continue. Assessments
that attempt to capture less tangible but more meaningful progress
indicators toward political goals will be the product of innovators insistent
on more sensible metrics but will often be overridden by deeply entrenched
American measuring and reporting instincts. 39
Continuing Blind Spots:
Hubris in Nation- Building
The evidence assembled across three eras of American counterinsurgency
experience reveals that although roundly abused in the Banana Wars and
Vietnam cases, the American can- do mentality—which perceives struggling
nations as a problem to be “fixed” and the American polity and its military
arm as the means to do so—did not suffer permanent and lasting harm and
was reasserted in the run- up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 40 Thomas Ricks
makes the point that not all US institutions were equally naive to the possible
complications endemic to regime change in Iraq. 41 Nevertheless, the dominating
perception among civilian overseers was that military intervention in Iraq
would achieve quick results and would not require a lengthy stay on the part
of US military forces. 42 Given the military’s reluctance to think in terms of
occupation duty, neither the Department of Defense nor Central Command
provided a serious counterweight to civilian assessments of a quick transition
to Iraqi self- rule. 43 Marine leadership engaged in a measure of postwar
planning on their own but were prohibited from accessing the State Department’s
comprehensive “Future of Iraq” study, which had laid out many of the
challenges likely to be faced. Referencing the study was considered taboo for
military planners since its long- range and complex approach was not compatible
with the Pentagon’s vision of a quick turnaround in postwar Iraq. 44
American hubris regarding nation- building is a product of a perceptual
lens that regards humans as problem- solving agents and the American