The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

208 Chapter 8
of the opposing forces. The guerrilla groups must be continually harassed
by patrols working throughout the theater of operation.” 39 Looking forward,
one would think CAP Marines were carrying this Small Wars chapter
around in their pockets.
Beating Guerrillas at Their Own Game:
The Signature of CAP Patrols
CAP units were small by design and were mandated to make daily and
nightly patrols right from the beginning of the program. Bruce Allnutt,
speaking in 1968, notes that by far “the largest proportion of the time
and energy of the CAP Marine is consumed in the planning, conduct, and
reporting of strictly military operations—the patrols and ambushes.” No
matter the “pacification” level, Marines were required to engage in “continual,
aggressive patrolling.” 40 The geographically bounded nature of their
patrolling, however, represents an important distinction from patrolling of
the Banana Wars sort. The objective of CAP patrols was not to seek out the
enemy and pursue him to extinction; rather, they were designed to clear and
hold a specific village—to protect it from VC incursions and discourage
any relationship with the VC at all. CAP Marines concerned themselves
with the enemy who entered the ville, not the enemy without. 41 While limited
in geographic reach, the mobile CAP units fit Marine psychology in
being offensively oriented. “We learned to move together as if we were one,
and we never made a sound. We were among the best at what we did.” 42
Given the units’ small size, their members had to create tactical depth by
cross- training on all weapons and achieving universal familiarization with
communications equipment. 43 Living in and patrolling a fixed geographic
location lent CAP Marines immense advantages in knowledge of terrain.
One recalled, “I guess the reason the Combined Action Program worked
so well, at least in our CAG [Combined Action Group], was the fact we
knew our AO [Area of Operations] so well. The regular grunt units left
and returned six weeks later, but we knew every bush, stick, and bend in
the river where an ambush could be set for us.” 44 CAP Marines knew they
were fighting in unconventional fashion, much closer to the ground, much
more like the enemy, and not at all like conventional Army units. “This CAP
compound [has] its advantages over the Victor Charlie due to the fact that
we use guerrilla tactics against guerrilla tactics instead of the major conventional
warfare as which are usually used in infantry tactics.” 45
The aggressive and geographically constrained patrolling style of the
CAP Marines yielded a number of benefits. Villagers responded first and
foremost to a clearly demonstrated ability to provide security. When Marines
succeeded in protecting them, villagers tended to open up. 46 When they did
not, the opposite occurred. One vet cites the example of Papa- 3, which was