The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Conclusion 257
(MAGTF) as well as the empowerment of small- unit leaders in decentralized
decision making. Both are well- established Marine modes of fighting that
represent sources of pride. Another is logistical excellence. It is important
to note that while all three are celebrated as having been tested and honed
in recent counterinsurgency fights, their additional appeal is the obvious
applicability to conventional conflict.
Training Indigenous Security Forces
Of those lessons particularly important to irregular warfare, training
indigenous forces garnered the most attention within Marine journals. A
long- standing and well- known tradition for the Corps, including during
peacetime, the Marine role in training and advising continues to be scrutinized
for areas where Marines can improve on performance. Today’s leathernecks
clearly “own” the training role, as indicated both by the earnest
tone of the articles and the consistent references to Marine heroes such as
Pete Ellis and Chesty Puller as iconic trainers. 1 Marines addressing the topic
emphasize that strides forward in effective advising are not only important
for counterinsurgency theaters, but are also immediately applicable to ongoing
partnering and training operations with allies. 2
Nearly two decades of counterinsurgency have moved this century’s
Devil Dogs well beyond their CAP program predecessors in imagining
which Marines can fill the advising and training role. Duty that involves
living together with indigenous forces—eating, sleeping, and training
beside them—has become a mentoring formula that is integral to the
Marine approach, albeit one requiring a high degree of maturity and discernment.
The widespread Marine Corps interest in this topic, identity
ownership of the role, and continued involvement in advisory tasks mean
that Marines are likely to absorb and improve on many of the lessons
learned in this category.
Despite the positive attention circulating around the training topic, an
important blind spot remains. American forces across time have focused
on the proper processing and training of locals as the key to an effective
indigenous security force rather than the existence of local will to fight in
the direction Americans are pointing. In Marine assessments of the Iraq
experience, disappointing performance on the part of indigenous forces is
attributed to insufficient training—a situation fixable through the talents,
hard work, and determination of their trainers—rather than insufficient will
to fight. Leatherneck- penned articles do not acknowledge or explore the cultural
or contextual incentives of indigenous recruits as variables that must
be considered when forecasting their readiness and likely fighting form.
Instead, Marines placed all responsibility to transform local recruits into
capable warriors—ready and willing to fight—on their own shoulders.