The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

276 Conclusion
entirety of the Marine rank and career advancement system privileges raw
combat experience:
To get command—the really big commands—to reach the stars in
a profession of arms, to develop his credibility and his mystique,
an officer needs, above all, corporate knowledge. He’s got to have
combat experience. That’s the goose that lays the golden eggs. And
with respect to combat, I think it’s fair to say that there is an unspoken
hierarchy of experiences. The bloodiest battle is up at the top
of the pyramid and it just goes downhill from there. So being in a
fight is always better than being near one, and being near a fight is
most certainly preferable to handing out soccer balls and attending
town- council meetings. 65
Marine warfighters will engage in the population- centric tasks they are
given because they expect to “do windows.” Flexibility and an acceptance
of an “all roles” lane in the duty lineup means that Marines will follow nontraditional
orders. It does not, however, change Marine default preferences.
Despite the population- centric bent of today’s counterinsurgencies,
there are a number of reasons why America’s Devil Dogs should find smallwars
fights attractive. It can certainly be plenty bloody enough. Warriors are
offered a chance to test their skills across more than enough deadly (and
even horrific) encounters in irregular combat. It also plays to Marine gruntbased
strengths. The Marine valuing of the human rather than technical
elements of war and the showcasing of the individual Marine as weapon
are nowhere better staged than in the small- unit, low- tech, marksmanshipintensive
combat outposts of counterinsurgency warfare. In addition, the
austere environment, away from large bases and masses of supporting
flanks, requires individual Marines to exercise the full range of their “adapt,
improvise, and overcome” training in a semiautonomous environment. 66
The “intangibles” on which Marines pride themselves—challenge, leadership,
and self- reliance—hold more promise for application in a dispersed
and decentralized irregular war than a conventional one. And whether
Marines are ready to admit it or not, the CAP program demonstrates that
a healthy mix of neighborly civic action in the stew of active combat can
yield strong emotional benefits for the Marines who participate. This combination,
especially in fights of dubious national necessity, provides a balm
to some of the disillusionment that might otherwise beset forces sent to
counterinsurgency scenes.
In addition, Marines can no longer argue, as did their Caribbean predecessors,
that irregular fights mean an inevitable stain on their service. To
date, Marine conduct in the Iraq War (with the exception of the Haditha
incident discussed in the previous chapter) remains largely celebrated by the
American domestic public. It is a mark of improved discipline and restraint