The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Know Thyself 17
actors.” 8 Strategic culture theorists have made their mark in the security
studies field by demonstrating the value of examining a critical and understudied
aspect of this formula: the impact of national and organizational
cultures on security policy.
Given the complex subject matter, it is unsurprising that diverse interpretations
abound concerning the appropriate approach to studying strategic
culture. A number of attempts have been made to capture into useful
categories the wide variety of scholarship strands within the body of strategic
culture scholarship. 9 Concurrently, sharp criticism has been directed at
the field for not achieving some level of methodological consensus. 10 David
Haglund acknowledges such criticism but points out that this is likely representative
of the growing pains of any big idea. In his essay “What Good Is
Strategic Culture?” he compares the concept of strategic culture to equally
amorphous and contested concepts such as “power” and “wealth.” Despite
eluding precise definition, these foundational concepts remain essential to
discussions of security policy. 11
A few consistent threads across the strategic culture literature are worthy
of note, especially as they pertain to the design of the Cultural Topography
Framework. Strategic culture remains a largely state- based method
of analysis. 12 Few attempts have been made to apply it to nonstate actors,
a deficit that has always been problematic but is perhaps most obviously
so in light of twenty- first- century security concerns. 13 If a core purpose of
pursuing cultural study is to win advantage against adversaries, then any
analytic concept fit for that purpose must be flexible enough to deal with
both traditional state- based threats and threats that operate independently
of the Westphalian structure.
Although early work on strategic culture tended to resort to somewhat
static profiles of state strategic cultures—a national personality of sorts—
later work has emphasized cultural dynamism and complexity—a topic that
naturally prompts questions about the causes of cultural shift over time.
Positions on this topic range the spectrum from Patrick Porter’s portrayal of
cultural influences as menus of choice, undergoing constant morphing on the
battlefield, 14 to Gray’s insistence that cultural variables that merit inclusion
under the strategic culture label be robust to the point of semipermanent
status, traits “not easily amended, let alone overturned, by acts of will.” 15
Semistatic portraits of national strategic culture have drawn criticism
from a range of scholars, including historians who point out that in some
historical episodes states exhibit the behavior expected from the assembled
portrait of their strategic culture and that in others they do not. Any forecasting
tool that assesses the influence of cultural variables must do a better
job of explaining when this will occur and why. 16 The literature that
comes closest to tackling this thorny problem is the scholarship dedicated
to examining strategic culture and change. Most tends to focus on strong
external shock as the primary impetus for change, 17 either in the form of