The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

232 Chapter 9
The Marines’ own account of the two years immediately following the
battles of Fallujah characterize Marine operations as “semi- conventional”—a
series of large sweeps, cordon and searches, raids, and patrols informed by
limited intelligence from the population. 73 Marines engaged in spoiling
attacks to keep the enemy on the defensive but did not have enough cooperation
from indigenous forces to hold an area once cleared. The approach
left them condemned to clear, clear, and clear again the same territory, a
process some likened to “whack a mole.” 74 Iraqis who consented to work
with Americans were often targeted by insurgents when US forces moved
on. 75 CAP veteran Bing West spent time on the ground in Iraq during this
period and observed that “counterinsurgency existed as a slogan, but without
changing the operational style of American battalions. In 2005, the battalions
continued to do what they knew best: sweeps, mounted patrols, and
targeted raids at night.” 76 Having served as a participant observer in Marine
operations in Anbar Province from 2004 to 2007, State Department political
officer Kael Weston recounts that infantry units exchanged constant
and bloody blows with insurgents—a “no- shit war”—but one that cycled
without yielding strategic progress. 77
Those officers participating in this phase were not unaware of the core
problem: Marines could not progress in their attempts to win the population
because their operations were fueling anger and were not providing
security. Iraqis working with Americans were being assassinated weekly. 78
Without the ability to protect local allies, little headway could be made
even given daily engagement with the tribes and consistent civic action. 79
The limited claims to effectiveness during this era are reminiscent of those
from Nicaraguan patrols: keeping the enemy “off balance” and, in the Iraq
case, the somewhat frequent discovery of weapons caches that could then be
denied to the adversary. 80 Marines counted success by tallying dead insurgents
and number of weapons found. 81 Those overseeing the civic action
side of the war were left to wonder whether in the larger strategic picture
the raids were doing more harm than good. 82
Amid the violence on the ground in the fall of 2005, the fortunes of
Marines were made worse by a particularly brutal incident. A squad in
Haditha was struck by an IED (improvised explosive device), which tore
apart a particularly beloved Marine. His fellow Marines responded with
immediate force, killing five young Iraqis running away. After reporting
sniper fire, they assaulted and cleared the rooms of nearby houses, killing
nineteen civilians, including women and children. 83
Reported in the American press as “horrific,” the incident in Haditha
became synonymous with Marine excess and brutality and threatened to
undermine public support for leatherneck efforts at an already grim time in
Iraq. 84 Although the Corps was roundly censured and investigated, Marines
made their way back into the good graces of the American public in reasonably
short order, likely because of their own sharp condemnation of