The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

162 Chapter 6
and unable to force itself to dispense jurisprudence in anything but closedranks
fashion. 117 This was in complete contravention of the Small Wars wisdom
that followed: “One of the most important duties of the inspector in
small wars is to investigate matters which involve controversies between
individuals of the force and local inhabitants. These investigations should
be promptly, thoroughly, and fairly made, bearing in mind the interests of
the individuals concerned and those of our Government. The finding of
facts should be recorded and filed for future reference to meet those charges
of impropriety which so often follow our withdrawal from the theater of
operations.” 118
The only tactical solution to have any real effect was to keep Marines as
segregated from the local population as possible. 119 On this point, Lt. Col.
Harold H. Utley recommended supplying goods directly from the States that
might otherwise be found in local markets, in order to avoid putting enlisted
Marines “in direct contact with the natives—native people, native liquor,
native women, native prices—all of which can be prevented by the exercise
of a little foresight.” 120 When conducting a patrol, Marines were ordered to
stay outside of saloons and houses and to interact as little as possible with
the natives. 121 Even within constabulary units, Marine officers often kept the
peace through segregation. 122
Not until the Senate inquiry of 1921 forced Marine abuses into the limelight
did the Corps take its own crackdown efforts seriously. Once they did,
in the form of Brig. Gen. Harry Lee, who aggressively prosecuted offenses
and actively pursued a change in the mentality of the troops stationed under
his command in the Dominican Republic, it became clear that impact could
have been made much earlier on. 123 Lee was able to put a stop to most of
the serious abuses in his jurisdiction, but the weight of past practices and the
persistent remnants of racism prevented the creation of productive relationships
with locals on any scale.
Banana Wars–era behavior toward locals produced a number of negative
strategic consequences. In all three Caribbean cases, Marines caused
grievances sufficient for joining insurgent ranks. Marine abuses produced
enemies sometimes faster than they could defeat them. 124 In the case of Haiti,
Marines were directly responsible for forced- labor policies (the corvée) that
inspired an entirely new round of insurgency. 125 To compound the matter,
the Gendarmerie was underprepared to help Marines respond, owing in
large part to Marines’ racist perceptions, which kept them from “trusting”
their Haitian enlisted men with guns and allowing them target practice. 126
Unsurprisingly, the racist behavioral context also had an impact on the
collection of intelligence. Although the Small Wars Manual speaks of cultivating
positive relations with locals in order to elicit useful intelligence, there
is no evidence that Marines were able to achieve this in any systematic way
during the Banana Wars. 127 Individual innovations occurred; for instance,
one Sergeant Darmond serving in Haiti—already ahead of his peers by being