The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Counterinsurgency in Iraq 247
in check until those local leaders with whom he had been working were able
to get two recalcitrant tribes on board. Alford made it clear that all relevant
regional tribes needed to be vested in the joint effort to oust extremists in
order for infrastructural investment to begin. It worked. 151
Units that followed Alford’s added to his success by implementing effective
measures to separate civilians from active insurgents. These included
using combined units in small outposts as “bait” to lure out insurgents (a
tactic reminiscent of the fight against Haitian cacos) and house- to- house visits,
which built up census databases identifying both persons and vehicles. 152
The practices initiated by Alford and duplicated or advanced by others fit
neatly within the overarching operating paradigm eventually adopted by
US civilian and military leadership: “clear, hold, and build.” 153 Application
of similar methods by both Marine and US Army forces across the region
resulted in a dramatic turnaround of US military fortunes. By the end of
December 2007, “attacks on Coalition forces had dropped to the lowest
levels since the conception of Multi- National Force- West in 2004.” 154
Lessons Threatened: Taking Early
Leave of Iraq
The Marines’ application of and improvements to prior counterinsurgency
lessons achieved operational, if not strategic, success. US forces became
perceived as a better friend to Sunni tribes than their own government.
Iraqi sheikhs offered opinions representative of Sunni sentiment: “To tell
you the truth, if you look at the Americans’ role, and what they did in here,
they were more interested in the welfare of the Iraqi people than the government
of Anbar was.” 155 In the fight against al- Qaeda, “the government
of Iraq didn’t help us with anything. It was all help from the Coalition.” 156
For some, the warmth that resulted between US and Iraqi forces ran deep:
“The relationship that developed here between the American forces and
the Iraqis was unlike any other relationship in the world. During meals, we
offered the Americans spoons to eat with, but they refused. They ate just
like Middle Easterners, with their own hands. Everybody supported our
movement. The Army and the Marines—I can’t say one supported us more
than the other.” 157
Operational success against insurgents had been achieved, but the political
end state required to declare strategic success remained elusive. By late
2008, Emma Sky, a political adviser to US forces, observed that “the greatest
threat to Iraq’s stability had become the legitimacy and capability of the government,
rather than insurgents.” 158 Sunnis continued to regard the Baghdad
government as “a Shi’a- led, Iranian- backed government” and warned that
a drawdown of US presence would exacerbate internal problems, creating a
situation “much more dangerous than in 2005.” 159