The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

104 Chapter 4
one must not become so reliant on technology as to be rendered dysfunctional
without it. 111 Cooling and Turner argue that the Corps has achieved
this in practice: “The Marine Corps notably avoids relying on technology
to the extent of the other Services” but is not unwilling to benefit from
the industrial might of its motherland. It maintains a cautious relationship
with technology—benefiting from but not becoming overly dependent on
it for success. 112 In this, the Marines take pride in representing a significant
contrast to their sister services. They do not “man” the equipment. They
equip the man.
As much as this mentality is celebrated within Marine circles, it may
come as a bit of surprise to those who regard them from afar. Compared to
the US Army and US Air Force, the Marine Corps may be man- centric, but in
the world of international militaries they still present a formidable technological
presence. Ben Anderson, a British journalist observing the changing
of the guard from the British Army to US Marine forces in Helmand Province
in 2009, registered a level of awe when the Marine machine landed:
“The British Army had shown incredible bravery and suffered horrendous
losses, yet it was impossible not to see the US Marines, with their billions
of dollars’ worth of new equipment, unlimited support, aggressive ambition
and unapologetic bluster, as the big boys coming to take charge.” 113
Marines reside in a technologically advanced and technologically driven
national military. Theirs will be a constant battle to keep eyes fastened on
manpower while awash in the siren calls of technological fixes to warfare’s
problems. This tension is represented in the Gazette, which celebrates the
investment in frontline Marines but spends a significant number of its
pages on technological advancements or prompts for innovations, including
calls for competency across the cyber spectrum. Some Marine authors
have openly derided the infantry focus necessary for maneuver warfare and
claim it as anachronistic in the cyber age. 114 An award- winning essay in the
Gazette complained of cultural elements that stifle adequate development
of expertise in advanced computer- based systems, capturing this mentality
through the words of an infantry lieutenant colonel who quipped: “The
more I learn about these computers the smaller my biceps get.” 115
Tension notwithstanding, Marines remain the consciously cultivated
technological underdog of the US military services. In this, they do maintain
an advantage for US forces in counterinsurgent warfare. Devil Dogs’
caution in their relationship with technology and continuing institutional
emphasis on self- reliance and on- the- fly fixes place Marines in a betterprepared
position than their American military counterparts to serve in austere
environments and navigate fighting terrain where advanced weapon
technology may not follow. As much as it is valued, the Corps will have to
continue a conscious and well- defended fight to keep its focus on investment
in personnel rather than technologically advanced military property as it
pushes through the twenty- first century.