The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Identity and Role 73
Marines’ painful political battle. Albeit central in their own eyes, the leathernecks’
unprecedented contribution to amphibious assault seemed to have
found little anchor in the public imagination:
In the eyes of the American people whom they serve, the history of
the United States Marines is reflected essentially as a procession of
noteworthy deeds by individuals and small groups. While this is not
inaccurate as a characterization of Marines, insofar as their part in
history is concerned, there is another—albeit less colorful—aspect
of their accomplishments which would appear in the long analysis
to deserve an even more prominent place in American historic
annals. This is the effort of the Marine Corps, conducted over the
past four decades, to rationalize the amphibious operation in terms
of modern arms and modern operational concepts. 126
The Corps continued to hold to amphibious assault as mission central but
began to dress up their role in other themes as well, resurrecting Fuller’s
“versatility” and the long-standing virtue of “readiness.” In describing to the
House Armed Services Committee of 1961 where the Marine Corps stood
and where it was headed, Commandant David M. Shoup (1960–63) reasserted
focus on the fighting man and his willingness to depart to any clime
and place: “The purpose of the Corps is to provide combat forces of willing
and able Marines, prepared to fight whenever and wherever required.” He
did not, however, abandon expertise in the amphibious role: “I believe that
the Navy–Marine Corps sea- air- ground team of today has perfected the art
of amphibious assault to a degree unknown before.” 127
Wallace M. Greene presided as commandant from 1964 to 1967 and
oversaw the Marines’ landing as combat forces in South Vietnam in 1965.
A year later he described that event, as well as an additional landing in
the Dominican Republic, to the Joint Committee on Armed Services and
Appropriations in the Senate as examples of the Marines performing their
“classic role” of “an amphibious landing on a foreign shore in support
of National policy, as directed by the President.” Greene pointed out that
near simultaneous landings on dual shores revalidated and emphasized
“the requirement to continue to maintain the most modern amphibious
capability in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.” Amphibious capability
is first in the limelight, but Greene also boosted the Corps’s versatility
credentials when describing its then current task set: patrolling and civic
action in the hamlets of Vietnam. Institutional willingness to be versatile
was apparent in his public statements on behalf of the Corps. His budget,
however, demonstrated that the priorities of the Corps remained amphibious.
Despite the fact that Marines were currently waging a ground war
in Indochina, Greene acknowledged that his research- and- development