The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Counterinsurgency Readiness 213
strength of character to enforce his decisions against argument or
complaint, and the endurance to live with his mistakes. And above
all, in his isolated position, he must be an excellent tactician. Rarely
is such responsibility placed in the hands of a 22 year- old (that is
the average—some are 19) sergeant in other units. If he is strong,
smart, and earns the respect of his men, the CAP is a superb fighting
machine; but if he weakens (because “after all, I have to live with
these guys”), loses control, or makes mistakes that destroy his men’s
respect for him, the CAP goes slack and becomes not only ineffectual
or a liability, but also quite vulnerable to the enemy. 70
Although the cumulative effect of the CAPs was largely a positive one,
the lack of supervision and the extraordinary autonomy placed in young,
largely untrained hands, meant that some individual CAPs succumbed to the
worst of human caprice. 71 Mission command is not a risk- averse strategy. To
hedge against those risks, the Corps will need to amplify both its significant
investment in leadership training and its emphasis on ethics and discipline.
This, combined with its newly enhanced recruiting image aimed at drawing
civic- minded as well as warrior- bound young men to the Corps, has the
potential to prepare a wider swath of NCOs for such weighty responsibility.
72 Although this may seem a tall order, it is not impossible. As he led the
2003 march to Baghdad, Maj. Gen. Jim Mattis propelled the First Marine
Division’s motto into Corps- wide mantra: “No Better Friend, No Worse
Enemy.” 73 To the Devil Dogs about to come face to face with Iraqis, he
added, “First, do no harm.” This signature commitment, if fully embraced by
the Corps, provides precisely the identity platform for the best of CAP- style
recruitment and training.
Notes
1. Capt. Randolph Coyle, “Service in Haiti,” Marine Corps Gazette (December
1916).
2. Capt. Walter N. Hill, “A Haitian Reconnoissance [sic],” Marine Corps Gazette
(March 1917).
3. To its credit, the Division of Operations and Training combined its observation
on the dearth of available reports with a call that they be submitted so that the
Gazette might disseminate them. This first article offers an initial few patrol
reports by way of example. Sgt. Glendell L. Fitzgerald et al., “Combat Reports
of Operations in Nicaragua,” Marine Corps Gazette (December 1928): 241.
4. Col. Ben H. Fuller, “Should the Marine Corps Have Its Own War College?”
Marine Corps Gazette (December 1916): 359. This sentiment is repeated fifteen
years later by Maj. Harold H. Utley. See Utley, “An Introduction to the
Tactics and Technique of Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette (May 1931): 50.