The Marines, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Culture

Counterinsurgency Readiness 207
the countryside. 28 Given that the primary challenge for Marines was finding
insurgents rather than killing them once discovered, Marines began using
their own small patrols as “bait”—attempting to lure their adversary into
attacking and then defeating them through expert marksmanship. 29
In all three episodes, small, aggressive patrols emerged as one of the
Marines’ most successful tactics in the counterguerrilla field during the
Banana Wars. 30 Many other approaches, such as concentrating the population
into designated zones in order to isolate insurgents, were not. 31 By
the time Marines came to the small- patrols tactical discovery (once again)
in Nicaragua, the Corps became serious about documenting it. 32 An article
titled “Events in Nicaragua since February 28, 1928” is a composite of
patrol reports; a similar set of articles became serialized in the Gazette. 33
Relentless patrols did not always result in the discovery of insurgent leaders,
or even the discovery of a respectable number of insurgent footmen to
kill, but could typically claim success in keeping the adversary off balance.
Marines were “constantly on the go, so that . . . [insurgents] in this area
never knew when or where a patrol would drop in on them.” 34 Marines
hoped that by keeping their adversary on the run, they could cause erosion
and perhaps fatal damage to organizational features of the insurgency,
including information flow: “Above all, an active and aggressive campaign
against the hostile forces in the field is the most effective method of destroying
their intelligence service. A guerrilla band which is constantly harassed
and driven from place to place soon loses contact with its own sources of
information; it becomes confused and its intelligence system breaks down.
As the occupation continues, superiority in this respect will gradually be
obtained by the intervening forces.” 35
As late as 1933, small- wars doctrinal advocate Colonel Utley was still
hedging on the now- proven tactic of small patrols. Rather than recommend
it outright, he advised small patrol use “when the military situation permits,”
in order to diminish “the comparative superiority of the irregular” in
tracking Marines’ whereabouts. 36 The combined wisdom of the Small Wars
Manual is more forthright: “It is desirable to keep the patrol as small as
is consistent with the accomplishment of its mission. The larger the patrol
the more difficult its control in combat, the more complicated its supply
problems, and the more it sacrifices in the way of concealment and secrecy
of movement.” 37 It advises patrols both small and relentless: “By energetic
patrolling of the area and vigorous pursuit of the hostile forces once contact
is gained, the irregulars should be forced to disband completely or to
move to more remote and less fertile areas. The pursuit of these small bands
must be continuous.” 38 Marines should expect to be outnumbered but not
outfought. Their victory will come through “increased fire power through
the proper employment of better armament, superior training and morale,
and development of the spirit of the offensive.” Mobility is key: “Infantry
patrols of the intervening force must develop mobility equal to that