journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

Choosing the Periphery 99
Being aware of a permanent Norwegian hesitation towards NORDEK, one should
ask how could a treaty be signed in February 1970 with the agreement of the Norwegian
government. Miljan certainly is right about a Nordic filter. 72 However, as is
evident from this paper, the Nordic identity was strongly constrained by Norwegian
national interests. 73 Had the NORDEK treaty been more precise and less ambiguous,
the authorities would not have accepted it, and if they had so, one would possibly
see the cleavage identified by the domestic-constraints perspective emerging. It
was accepted because it generally carried little substance and weak institutions.
The treaty's section on agricultural policy (section 7) reveals few binding commitments
within a jungle of ambiguities. The only identifiable change was that supplementary
imports from 1972 onwards would come from Nordic producers. Admittedly,
the treaty would shove national fishery regulations, however not
dramatically. This would nevertheless be somewhat balanced by the benefits on fish
exports. Under any circumstance, The Hague meeting of the EC Council of Ministers
had undermined the NORDEK treaty before it was signed.
IV. Applications and Bargaining Policy: Exploiting the Peripheral Image
Membership in the European Community, as stated, was never a national goal, and
the British applications always created awkward political agendas. Norway nevertheless
went along in order to negotiate special access conditions. As the political
economy remained stable, Norway's bargaining policy on all three Community-membership
negotiation rounds was basically the same. This aimed at exploiting
the image of a country constrained by peripheral conditions.
The liberalisation in the movement of capital could be acceptable, and on all
three occasions Norway only wanted extended transition periods. 74 The strategy
subsequently used to retain State control of savings and investments was to put
pensions in one public fund, thus retaining control over credit allocation. In 1967,
as Norway handed in the second EEC-membership application, all national-insurance
schemes were merged into one national security system. As the general interest
rate was supposed to increase if capital regulations were subordinated to EEC
regulations, State banks, receiving their funds from the national security system,
would be able to maintain a low interest rate. 75 Hence, those questions concerning
agriculture and fisheries remained as of primary concern.
72. T. MILJAN, The Reluctant Europeans. The Attitudes of the Nordic Countries Towards European
Integration, London, 1977, p.97.
73. On general dissimilarities among the Nordic countries towards Nordic and European integration,
cf. T.B. OLESEN, Choosing or refuting Europe? The Nordic Countries and European Integration,
1945-2000, in: Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol.25, 2000, pp.147-168.
74. The Norwegian EEC accession treaty in 1972 comprised a transition period of five years for the
movement of capital and three years to make permit legislation non-discriminatory.
75. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 14 December 1970, p.13.