journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

48
Birgit Aschmann
tion of relieving the budget in Bonn and the conscience of the German minister of
Economic affairs.
At the same time, the Federal Government feared the political consequences,
which Spain could incur as a result of its economic exclusion. An aggravation of
Spain's economic performance could become a direct menace to the political order.
Thus the Federal ministry of Foreign affairs already scented “a revolutionary explosive
for the Iberian peninsula, which can catch fire, if liberalisation within the
frame of a free Europe does not go hand in hand with an adjustment of the Spanish
standard of living to that of the European countries”. 44 For the Federal Government
it was important to maintain political stability in Spain. Especially from the point
of view of Western security strategies subversive sparks at the South West edge of
Europe were to be avoided. Thus the aspect of the reinforcement of the West was a
current argument of the Federal ministry of Foreign affairs in favour of Spanish
integration.
In exchange of the safety guarantees, which Spain seemed to offer, the Germans
were willing to put aside for the time being political doubts as to the anti-democratic
character of the Franco regime. On the other side, it would have ill befitted the young
Federal Republic, which did not want to leave the slightest doubt about its own democratic
foundation, to have a completely uncritical attitude towards the authoritarian
state. Actually the Federal Republic too asked for a democratisation of Spain. Nevertheless
the Federal Government unlike the social-democratic opposition, which regarded
democratisation as a precondition to European integration, believed that integration
would be the appropriate means to bring about such liberalisation. In this context the
Federal Government was concerned about making this process take place in both a
slow and controlled manner. It counted on a political evolution and wanted to avoid at
any price a revolution. Remembering the Spanish turmoil in the run-up to the Civil War
the Federal Government feared the outbreak of chaos, if the pace of the developments
would speed up: “Experience of the time of the Republic and the anarchical traits
always latently inherent in the Spanish national character exhort to thaw the ice block of
the authoritarian regime only slowly, in order not to fling the country again into a revolutionary
whirl”. 45
The German diplomats in Spain tended to adopt the official Spanish viewpoint.
This was most strikingly the case when evaluating the Spanish government's nervous
reaction vis-à-vis a supposed conspiracy at the time of the 4 th Congress of the
European Movement, which took place in Munich, in June 1962. As part of the
congress resolutions, Spanish opposition politicians together with exile Spanish
had drawn up a resolution, which called for liberalisation measures prior to any attempt
to consider the question of Spain's association with the EEC. This was presented
by the Spanish authorities as an anti-Spain conspiracy and was thus official-
44. PAAA I A 4/318: Record “für eine evtl. Bundestagsdebatte aus Anlass der ersten Beratung des
Vertrages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Spanischen Staat über die Kriegsopferversorgung,
4.-6.3.1964” by Adolf Velhagen, in charge of the department of Spanish affairs
at the ministry of Foreign affairs, and Hans Georg Stelzer, 3 March 1964.
45. Ibidem.