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Choosing the Periphery 83
rates. Adopting the economic-modernisation perspective one comes to realise that the
Norwegian authorities – in contrast to the geopolitical-challenges view that the fear of
being left outside the Community was stronger than the wish to be inside – felt attraction
for a stable international market regime, even if not necessarily the Community's
tariff union. The economic modernisation perspective will show more sides of the
picture than heretofore, without necessarily eliminating earlier ones.
This paper takes all three perspectives – labelled geopolitical challenges, domestic
constraints and economic modernisation – into account. However, it seeks
explanations not in geopolitical but in domestic challenges. The argument is conditioned
by insights from the domestic constraints perspective while aiming to develop
the argument of economic modernisation even further. The geopolitical challenges
perspective is certainly right when it claims that British decisions placed EC
membership issue on the Norwegian political agenda. Indeed, foreign policy had an
Anglo-American orientation and there is evidence in the white papers on EFTA that
all Norwegian governments during the 1960s envisaged British leadership in enforcing
bridge building, whatever that meant at each point in time, between EFTA
and the Community. 24 However, as implied by those within the geopolitical challenges
research perspective, it is erroneous to believe – as Sæter claims – that security
considerations left “ordered priorities”. 25
I reject the idea that security policy and even foreign policy structured the approach
to the EEC membership issue and, even less, determined policy options.
Had this been the case, foreign-policy and security-policy issues would have been
far more conspicuous in perceptions and debates than what they actually were. 26 As
a matter of fact, all white papers conveying the governments' arguments for resuming
negotiations left out considerations of security policy. 27 The Community was
not considered in security terms because Norway regarded NATO as a sufficient
guarantor. During the hard negotiations with the EC in October 1971, the Norwegian
ambassador in Brussels, Jahn Halvorsen, assured his British counterpart,
Michael Palliser, that the Norwegian government
24. Stortingsmelding [White Paper] (henceforth St.m.) No.61, 1962-63, “Om utbyggingen av samarbeidet
i Det Europeisk Frihandelsforbund” [On strengthening the co-operation in EFTA]; No.6,
1963-64, “Om den fortsatte utbygging av samarbeidet i Det Europeiske Frihandelsforbund” [On
the continued strengthening of co-operation in EFTA]; and No.33, 1966-67, “Om samarbeidet i
EFTA” [On co-operation in EFTA].
25. Cf. note 5.
26. On Parliamentary debates, cf. contributions in N. ÖRVIK (ed.), Fears and Expectations. Norwegian
Attitudes Towards European Integration, Oslo, 1972.
27. St.m. No.15, 1961-62, “Om det Europeisk Økonomiske Fellesskap og de europeiske markedsproblemer”
[On the European Economic Community and the European market problems]; St.m. No.67,
1961-62, “Om Norges stilling til Det Europeiske Økonomiske Fellesskap og de europeiske samarbeidstrebelser”
[On Norway's relations to the European Economic Community and European cooperative
endeavours]; St.m. No.86, 1966-67, “Om Norges forhold til de europeisk fellesskap”
[On Norway's relations to the European Communities]; St.m. No.92, 1969-70, “Om Norges
forhold til de nordiske og europeiske markedsdannelser” [On Norway's relations to the Nordic and
European market formations].