journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

40
Birgit Aschmann
Particularly Erhard’s response was far more restrained than the Spanish wanted to
admit. When the Spanish minister of Finance Mariano Navarro travelled to Bonn in
February 1962 and was quite confident in his talks with Erhard, that the Spanish request
would be dealt with rather quickly, the German minister of Economics dryly
pointed out to him that anything but a swift handling of the Spanish application was
to be expected, on account of bureaucratic obstacles, as well as the British application,
which had priority and political reservations of some member countries. 13 The
evolution of events was to show that Erhard was right. Even the steady support from
the Federal Republic was not able to accelerate the procedure. The struggle alone for
a first reply to the Spanish EEC-application letter gave an idea of how problematic
the Spanish question continued to be on the European level. Although Germany and
France pronounced for a positive answer, the Benelux countries put through that the
Spanish application was confirmed in March 1962 by a simple acknowledgement of
receipt, which the Spanish administration considered a “frosty” reaction. 14
At a symposium of the European Centre for Documentation and Information (CE-
DI) at El Escorial, Madrid, the minister of Federal Council Affairs, Hans-Joachim von
Merkatz announced in the very summer of 1962, that the Federal Government did not
identify itself with the negative attitude of the Community. To the delight of his audience,
he spoke of the “admiration and respect” felt by the German people regarding the
historical achievements and sacrifices of the Spanish people. He declared that the accession
to the EEC not only was possible, but that it was over and above necessary, as
Europe would “disown its identity without the Spanish contribution, because Spain belonged
to Europe on the basis of its history, its religious faith and its sense of honour”. 15
The lack of democracy characterising the Franco state did not carry great weight with
the members of the CEDI; it came second to the effort of strengthening the Christian
West against the supposed Bolshevist aggressor. 16 The CEDI presented itself as a cultural
meeting place for like-minded people and from the 1950s it also crystallised as a
political forum, where meetings of statesmen could be arranged, when official talks
13. PAAA Ref 206/167: “Besuch des spanischen Finanzministers Navarro Rubio 19.-24.2.1962”,
record by Allardt, then director of the economic department of the Federal ministry of Foreign affairs,
20 February 1962.
14. On the feelings of the Spanish administration see R. BASSOLS, España en Europa, op.cit., p.44.
On the efforts of secretary of State Rolf Lahr to send the Spanish government a more positive answer,
see PAAA Ref. 206/167: Report by department 2, 30 March 1962.
15. PAAA Ref. 206/162: Report by ambassador von Welck about the XI CEDI Conference, Madrid, 3 July 1962.
16. On the CEDI see B. ASCHMANN, Treue Freunde?, op.cit., pp.427-435. On the circumstances of
the its foundation as well as on its structure, see in particular A. MORENO JUSTE, El Centro Europeo
de Documentación e Información. Un intento fallido de aproximación a Europa, 1952-1962,
in: J. TUSELL, S. SUEIRO, J.M. MARÍN and M. CASANOVA (eds.), El régimen de Franco,
op.cit., pp.459-474. Even if Moreno Juste declares the attempt on the whole failed to initiate via the
CEDI a specific EEC-policy, he must nevertheless admit that up to a certain extent the CEDI succeeded
in propagating a favourable image of Spain or in taking influence on some politicians. On the
mental orientation of CEDI-members also see P.M. WEBER, El CEDI: promotor del occidente
cristiano y de las relaciones hispano-alemanas de los años cincuenta, in: Hispania, vol.LIV/3,
No.188, September-December 1994, pp.1077-1103, which presents in Spanish the findings of
Weber’s dissertation concerning the CEDI.