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Choosing the Periphery 97
Norwegian exports due to the EEC's common external tariff (CET) was about
eighty-five percent, i.e. NOK 300 million in 1961. According to minister of Industry
Kjell Holler the total tariff burden would then be approximately ten per cent of
total turnover, while the average profit was fifteen percent. The CET would thus reduce
Norwegian industry profits by a sixty-six percent and remove the ability of industry
to finance the planned expansion itself. The government was afraid that the
EEC tariff union would threaten the export industry's ability to expand. However,
this fear vanished subsequently due to schemes ensuring that a major part of Norwegian
exports to the EEC was not exposed to tariff increases by the transition to
the common external tariff. Actually, in 1970, forty-two per cent of Norway's total
exports to the EEC, including aluminium and ferro-alloys, were subjected to special
tariff schemes. 62 Originally List G had been perceived as a major threat to the
traditional export industry. However, it turned out that items on List G were treated
much better than expected. Therefore, a favourable List G was perceived as more
important to sustain traditional exports than EFTA membership. The major concern
with respect to the EEC was that schemes under List G would be discarded.
During the first negotiations of the Kennedy round in GATT, the government
sensed that the Six, now negotiating jointly through the Commission, would give
priority to protection and weaken the favourable schemes for the traditional Norwegian
export industry. Foreign minister Halvard Lange anticipated that forty per cent
of exports to the EEC were threatened. 63 For Norway, the Kennedy round received
a far higher priority than EFTA's Vienna initiative in May 1965, which intended to
arrange a joint meeting at ministerial level between the two preferential trading
groups in order to solve commercial problems. The Norwegian government successfully
joined forces with other Nordic governments and negotiated jointly a unified
contracting party to GATT in order to counteract the anticipated protectionist
policy of the Six. Norway placed less confidence in the British after the introduction
of the import surcharge. Actually, when it comes to manufacturing industry,
the main problem for Norway during the accession negotiations with the Community
in 1970-72 was British demands for tariff quotas that would hurt traditional
Norwegian export.
Throughout the 1960s the Norwegian authorities nevertheless supported the
idea of bridge building between EFTA and the EEC, and felt that a solution would
lie closer to the Treaty of Rome than to the Stockholm convention. 64 However, they
continuously insisted on multilateral negotiations, which would not include the primary
sector. When the government supported commercial arrangements between
the four applicants and the Community after French president Charles de Gaulle's
veto in 1967, the intention was not to facilitate the possibility of any future EEC
membership but, according to John Lyng, minister of Foreign affairs, to “prevent
further splits between market groups in Europe”. 65 EFTA provided a good balance
62. St.m. No.50, 1971-72, op.cit., p.31.
63. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 22 October 1964, p.23.
64. UD, 44.36/6.84 vol.25, Note on Norway and the Community, 4 February 1966.
65. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 5 February 1968, p.7.