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The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports Spain's European Integration Efforts 49
ly labelled the Contubernio de Múnich. The Spanish authorities reacted with
disproportionately severe sanctions. 46 In his account, the German ambassador von
Welck clearly criticised the Spanish opposition, which by its action had tried to
“discredit the Franco regime and to impede Spain’s association with the EEC”. Von
Welck did not have any understanding for the calls for recognition of political parties,
democratic representation, freedom of the press, etc., because their realisation
was possible “only by overthrowing the Franco regime, which would entail unforeseeable
consequences for Spain and Europe”. 47
The Federal Government expected a slow but sure opening from a Spanish integration.
In all internal papers on the Spanish issue in the 1960s the Federal Government
affirmed that precisely the objective of a democratisation of the country was a
central motive for advocating a close connection of Spain to Europe. The Federal
Government was firmly convinced that liberal processes, once they got going
would gather momentum:
“A closer co-operation with the countries of the free world, particularly within the
frame of the EEC, by the automatism of modern free economy will certainly support
via the social policy also Spain’s further democratisation, whereas a failure of the
integration efforts would reinforce the risks of the adaptation crisis and possibly
throw the country again on to the old track”. 48
So the German diplomats were readily willing to take at their face value the tactically
motivated statements of the Spanish according to which they were prepared to
make political concessions in the case of a connection with the EEC. 49
The reliability of the Franco government so highly appreciated by the Federal
Government was founded among other things on its unalterable ideological orientation.
In the times of the Cold War the determined anti-communism of Franco
Spain was considered to be of great value to the West and particularly to the Federal
Republic whose domestic policy was based on Western anti-communism. As
long as the main attention of Western policy focussed on the defence against the
Soviet Union, the country at the junction of the political systems could rely on special
attentiveness, and as long as the Eastern satellite-states were regarded as a
product of the sanctions of the illegitimate totalitarian regime, the Federal Republic’s
claim for sole representation remained unchallenged. In the 1950s however the
process of habituation inexorably set in and the existence of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) was taken more and more for granted. For the Christian-Democratic
Federal Government it became all the more important to insist on its legal
position, in order to counteract international acknowledgement of the German
status quo. In this campaign every friend was welcome. Spain proved to be one of
46. On “Contubernio”, see reports by the victims in F. ÁLVAREZ DE MIRANDA, Del “contubernio”
al consenso, Barcelona, 1985, pp.31-39. See also J. SATRÚSTEGUI (ed.), Cuando la
Transición se hizo posible. El “Contubernio de Múnich”, Madrid, 1993.
47. Both quotations, in PAAA Ref. 206/162: Report by ambassador von Welck, 23 June 1962.
48. PAAA I A 4/318: Record by Velhagen and Stelzer, cit., 3 March 1964.
49. On the instructions by minister of Foreign affairs Castiella to the Spanish ambassadors to reaffirm
Spain’s willingness for a change, see F. GUIRAO, “Association”, op.cit., p.118.