journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

80
Hans-Otto Frøland
with the British from 1950 to 1959. In 1957 the government was also inclined to
follow the British into a wider European free trade area. After this failed, EFTA
was a good solution because it united the Atlantic and the Nordic foreign policy
orientations. A purely Nordic solution, which had been discussed since 1947,
proved impossible without British participation. Thus, in accordance with the perspective
that gives predominance to the geopolitical challenges, EFTA can be regarded
as redemption of basic foreign policy orientation. However, the Norwegian
authorities much preferred a process of European integration within the framework
of NATO. This, among other issues, had been one of the reasons why in 1955 the
government called for the expansion of NATO co-operation into civilian areas. 9
The study of Norway's European integration policy and attitudes adopted another
perspective after the referendum in September 1972; one, which took into consideration
domestic, constraints. The underlying question in this perspective was
why the people did not share the authorities' inclination to join the Community.
Scholars thus started to study the political mobilisation against EC membership
and the socio-political conditions for its success. The negative outcome of the 1994
referendum certainly confirmed the relevance of this perspective. What are the
most significant results ensuing when adopting this new perspective?
The membership issue activated an otherwise stable electorate. It produced rifts
that cleaved through the political landscape polarised along the right-left axis. 10
The basic trend was that those in favour resided in urban areas while rural residents
opposed. The lesser the urbanisation and the longer the distance to urban centres,
the greater the opposition. The closer one came to Oslo, the greater the inclination
to accept Norwegian EEC membership. 11 There was a no-majority in 387 out of
444 municipalities. The opposition prevailed most in small fishing communities in
Northern Norway. The rifts could be interpreted as a socio-economic phenomenon,
as the primary sector was localised in rural areas; as a socio-cultural phenomenon,
due to the contrasts between urban and rural communities; and as a socio-political
phenomenon, as there was a conflict between the elite and the rank and file. Together
they were looked upon as a profound cleavage between the centre and the periphery
that had been reinforced throughout the 19th century. 12 A notable exception
9. On policy towards NATO cf. O. RISTE, Was 1949 a turning point?, in: O. RISTE (ed.), Western
Security: The Formative Years, Oslo, 1985, pp.128-149; R. TAMNES, The United States and the
Cold War in the High North, Oslo, 1991; G. LUNDESTAD, The Evolution of Norwegian Security
Policy: Alliance with the West and Reassurance in the East, in: Scandinavian Journal of History,
Vol.17, 1992, pp.227-256; and M. BERDAL, The United States, Norway and the Cold War,
1954-1960, Basingstoke, 1996.
10. H. VALEN and S. ROKKAN, Norway: Conflict structure and mass politics in a European periphery, in:
R. ROSE (ed.), Electoral behaviour: a comparative handbook, New York, 1974, pp.315-370.
11. O. HELLEVIK and N.P. GLEDITSCH, The Common Market decision in Norway: A clash between
direct and indirect democracy, in: Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.8, 1973, pp.227-235.
12. Cf. H. VALEN, Norway: No to EEC, in: Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.8, 1973, pp.214-226;
and National Conflict Structure and Foreign Politics: The Impact of the EEC Issue on Perceived
Cleavages in Norwegian Politics, in: European Journal of Political Research, Vol.4, 1976,
pp.47-82.