journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...
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90<br />
Hans-Otto Frøland<br />
percent. In 1949 only about twenty-four per cent <strong>of</strong> the registered fishermen had fishing<br />
as their sole source <strong>of</strong> income. Although the proportion <strong>of</strong> such fishermen increased to<br />
fifty percent in 1971, seen together the majority <strong>of</strong> the Norwegian farmers and fishermen<br />
earned part <strong>of</strong> their incomes from other activities. Estimates in the 1960s indicated<br />
that the incomes <strong>of</strong> about twenty-five per cent <strong>of</strong> the population were mainly <strong>de</strong>rived<br />
from the primary sector. Due to this, there were few major conflicts in the rural areas,<br />
and, in agreement with the basic insight from the domestic-constraints perspective, the<br />
dominant cleavage provoked by the issue <strong>of</strong> membership in the EC was between urban<br />
centres and rural peripheries. Hence, it was wise <strong>of</strong> politicians to sell both agricultural<br />
and fisheries policies to the public as regional policy aimed at retaining a dispersed population<br />
in the rural areas. The un<strong>de</strong>rpinning for the strong position <strong>of</strong> the primary sector<br />
is well <strong>de</strong>scribed by the frustration expressed by ministers <strong>of</strong> Tra<strong>de</strong>, Arne Skaug, and<br />
Industry, Kjell Holler, when in a joint meeting with the head <strong>of</strong> the industrial association<br />
in 1959 and after openly <strong>de</strong>claring their common <strong>de</strong>sire to change the country's agricultural<br />
policy, “stated, not really breaking new ground, that this was a very <strong>de</strong>licate<br />
matter which no political party wished to touch”. 37 The government simply dared not<br />
risk rapid restructuring because it could topple the agrarian compromise originally<br />
struck in 1935.<br />
The authorities resisted any international effort to liberalise the primary sector<br />
in the 1950s. Difficulties in the balance <strong>of</strong> payments formed the recurrent argument<br />
used when liberalisation efforts commenced in the OEEC. The rationale used for<br />
resistance to the proposed European Agricultural Community between 1951 and<br />
1954 was also the negative effects on the balance <strong>of</strong> payments. 38 Not until 1958 did<br />
protectionism become the <strong>of</strong>ficial reason for sheltering agriculture. 39 During the<br />
1950s the argument that climatic and structural conditions called for permanent<br />
protection gained prominence. This was used when the governments rejected Danish<br />
efforts to inclu<strong>de</strong> agriculture in a Nordic preference area, as well as when Norway<br />
supported Great Britain's proposition to keep agriculture out <strong>of</strong> a possible free<br />
tra<strong>de</strong> area among the OEEC member-States (henceforth referred to as FTA). The<br />
next section shows that this argument was also used to justify unconditional <strong>de</strong>mands<br />
that Norway's primary sector was to be exempted from Community regulations<br />
in case <strong>of</strong> accession to the EEC.<br />
Similar protection was actively claimed in fishery. After the Geneva negotiations,<br />
in 1960, failed to yield a satisfactory outcome, Norway unilaterally exten<strong>de</strong>d<br />
its fishing zone from about four to twelve nautical miles in 1961. The move was regar<strong>de</strong>d<br />
necessary to maintain a dispersed population in Northern Norway, where<br />
still in 1970 the employment <strong>of</strong> about forty per cent <strong>of</strong> the population <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>d<br />
upon coastal fisheries. The unilateral extension implied that foreign nationals, who<br />
37. RA, PNI, box 1656, Minutes, meeting <strong>of</strong> Monrad Aas, Presi<strong>de</strong>nt, with Arne Skaug and Kjell Holler,<br />
15 September 1959.<br />
38. H. ESPELI, Norway and the Green Pool, in: Scandinavian Journal <strong>of</strong> History, Vol.19, 1994,<br />
pp.327-347.<br />
39. H. ESPELI, Jordbruksproteksjonisme og han<strong>de</strong>lspolitikk [Agricultural protection and tra<strong>de</strong> policies],<br />
Ås 1992, pp.131-166.