journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

46
Birgit Aschmann
Compared with the vociferous pro-Spanish rhetoric, which unceasingly repeated
that Germany was a reliable ally supporting the European integration efforts of
Spain, the actual result is surprisingly meagre. The key to the understanding of this
discrepancy lies in the analysis of the Federal Government’s motives.
German Motivations
The Federal Government had economic as well as political reasons for supporting the
Spanish EEC-policy. As far as the economic aspects are concerned: If Spain did not
participate in the European economic unification that was progressing, the Spanish
agricultural produce were likely to become more expensive for the German consumer
because of the common external tariffs applied by the EEC States, which were
clearly higher than the former bilaterally negotiated tariff rates. Given the fact that
fifty-five per cent of the German orange imports came from Spain, whereas only
eight percent were imported from Italy, a price increase of the Spanish products did
not meet the needs of the German market. 35 In addition lower sales of Spanish
oranges abroad would lead to a drop in Spanish earnings of foreign exchange, which
would reduce the Spanish purchasing power and hence the exportations of German
industrial products to Spain. The minister of Commerce Ullastres intimated to a delegation
of German industrials that such consequences would have to be seriously reckoned
with. If Spanish agricultural produce continued to be disadvantaged, it was not
to be ruled out that German products soon could only be admired at Spanish trade
fairs or exhibitions, but no longer be bought. 36 Thus already for practical economic
considerations, the Federal Republic, whose economic goods as opposed to France or
Italy were not in competition with those of Spain (apart from the wine), had to be
interested in Spain’s close connection to the EEC.
On top of pragmatic considerations there were also questions of principle. The
Federal Republic had followed with satisfaction how Spain had opened since 1957
and especially since the stabilisation measures in the summer of 1959 to a gradual
liberalisation of foreign trade. The drastic economic adjustment had been carried
out with a view to affiliation with the European economic trade area. In order to enable
Spain to achieve the promised and expected results, European concessions
were required. This argumentation amounted to a moral obligation. The politicians
in Bonn were aware of having to assume their share of the responsibility for the
current Spanish economic policy in so far as they had urged the Spanish to the
course adjustment by unceasing exhortations and encouragement. 37
35. PAAA I A 4/391: “Antworten auf das Interview, Fragen vom spanischen Journalisten Alfonso
Barra, ABC, an Aussenminister Schröder”, 11 March 1966.
36. PAAA Ref. 412/ 473: Ambassador Allardt to the Federal ministry of Foreign affairs, 1965.
37. See, for instance, the minutes of the conversations held by Erhard with José Solís, Spanish minister,
Secretary of the Movimiento and the Syndicate Organisation, on 16 June 1959 in PAAA Ref.
206/165 and with Foreign minister Castiella on 10 November 1959 in PAAA Ref. 206/166.