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Portugal's European Integration Policy, 1947-72 35
Conclusion
The hostility of the Portuguese Premier Salazar towards European supranational organisations
was not only the consequence of his nationalistic ideology but also due to the
perceived threat they represented to his autocratic regime. Salazar was aware that if the
concept of European integration gained popularity in Portugal it would lead to pressure
in favour of democracy. By the same token, Salazar was worried that if the concept of
federalism gained adepts in Portugal, as the logical evolution of a unified Empire, it
would reduce his autocratic power and ultimately question the regime itself. Portugal’s
European policy, Magalhães believes, resulted from the “personal initiative” of Corrêa
d’Oliveira, who managed to obtain the “resigned” support of Salazar. 39 It would be
churlish to deny the importance of Corrêa d'Oliveira, yet Portugal was already a member
of the OEEC before Corrêa d’Oliveira reached office in 1955, and was to sign a
trade agreement with the EEC after he left office in 1969.
The active policy of the Portuguese government regarding European integration
was, in political terms, an attempt to maintain its external economic relations at the
intergovernmental, not supranational level. This led the government to seek FTA membership
first and then EFTA membership, judging that if Portugal were left out in the
cold it would be dangerous not only to the domestic economy but also to its political regime.
As a member of EFTA, the Portuguese government believed that in future negotiations
with the EEC it was in a safe position. The second objective of the Portuguese
government pursued with the FTA and EFTA membership was to guarantee economic
development. By the late 1950s the Portuguese government faced increased domestic
pressure, which should be encountered with a successful European policy.
Britain’s request for EEC membership in 1961 exposed the fallacy of the Portuguese
government’s expectations on maintaining foreign economic relations at the intergovernmental
level through EFTA membership. Salazar and his cabinet implicitly accepted the
failure of their early views by deciding that EEC association was the best policy option to
protect Portuguese interests, guarantee economic expansion and finance the colonial war.
Such was the desire of the cabinet to negotiate successfully with the EEC that it was prepared
to exclude the colonies from membership during a prolonged transition period and
was ready to accept less favourable terms than those negotiated by Greece. The option in
1972 for a trade agreement reflected both the increased international isolation of the Portuguese
government due to its continued colonial policy and the intransigent opposition of
Salazar's successor, Caetano, to EC membership. In 1977, less than five years later, Portugal
finally applied for full membership, after democracy had been re-established in 1974
and the colonies had become independent.
Nicolau Andresen-Leitão
History and Civilization Department
at the European University Institute
39. R.T. GUERRA, A.S. FREIRE and J.C. MAGALHÃES, Movimentos de Cooperação …, op.cit., p.53. This
constitutes an opinion shared by the main writers on this period. Rollo provides a useful synopsis of Salazar’s
thinking on European integration and challenges previous accounts by arguing that Salazar was flexible on his
European policy when necessary; “Salazar e a construção europeia”, in: Penélope, no.18(May 1998), pp.51-76.