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Choosing the Periphery:
The Political Economy of Norway's European Integration Policy,
1948-73
Hans-Otto Frøland
It would apparently have been easy to bring Norway into the European Community (EC)
fold in 1973. The expanded EC was the recipient of over fifty per cent of Norway's commodity
exports, which indicates the profound Norwegian trade dependence on Community
markets. Per capita income was on the same level as that of the Community's core
countries, indicating the prospective of painless socio-economic integration. Although
Norway's security rested fundamentally upon American guarantees, the Community had
also occupied an expanding position in Norway's political orientation throughout the
1960s. Indeed, political changes in West Germany had made it more difficult to regard the
Community as contrary to the Nordic social democratic third way. Any perception of
being different would at any rate become impossible with British and Danish entry into
the Community. Irrespective of the Community's definition of Europeanness in 1973 –
geographically, culturally or politically – Norway would be included. Politically as well as
functionally the country depended to such an extent on the Community that observers had
expected Norwegian membership in 1973.
Nonetheless, a sufficient degree of national will for membership was lacking. A treaty
of accession was signed in January 1972. The Labour government mobilised all political
resources available in support of the treaty and the Norwegian parliament seemed also inclined
to accept the terms of admission. Nonetheless, the treaty was rejected in the referendum
of September 1972. Fifty-three per cent of the votes opposed the treaty, with only
forty-seven per cent in favour. Thus, by refraining from joining the Community and retaining
formal sovereignty, Norway chose to remain on the fringe of European integration.
In terms of European political influence the nation chose the periphery.
How should this choice be understood? When citizens who voted against the
proposal were polled to ascertain why they did so, the two most frequent answers
referred to the loss of sovereignty and the effects on the primary sectors. 1 The poll
pinpointed the essence of the population's concerns. The Community challenged a
primary sector that totally depended on national sovereignty. Norway had gained
its independence in 1905 and the choice certainly also reflected a young nation-State's
need for self-assertion. Federalism was never supported by the public,
and it is symptomatic that the only Norwegian statement in favour of a united Europe
Walter Lipgens could find for publication was by Vidkun Quisling, the politician
who betrayed his country to the Nazis and become their puppet ruler in 1940. 2
1. CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NORWAY, Folkeavstemningen om EF [The Advisory
Referendum on Norway's Accession to the EC], Vol. II, NOS A 544, Oslo 1973, p.57.
2. W. LIPGENS and W. LOTH (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol.1,
Continental Plans for European Union, New York, 1985, Doc.10, pp.78-80, cf. also p.44. Quisling's
ideas were, however, more pro-Germanic than pro-European unity.
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