journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Nicolau Andresen-Leitão
Community (EDC) treaty, which included plans for a European Political Community,
was also signed in Paris. The motives behind these two supranational organisations
were clear to Salazar: American policy and French weakness. The former, “does not
see another political solution for Europe, other than unity through federation”, the latter
“adopts the idea to avoid German rearmament”. The idea of a European federation
was “repugnant” to the Portuguese people, according to their ruler, because of “their
love of independence and the overseas territories”. The Portuguese vocation, according
to Salazar, lay in the overseas territories and not in the “disagreements of continental
Europe”. If in the face of European pressure to integrate, Portugal had to seek
an external link it should be the creation of an “Iberian-American bloc”. 9 Fortunately,
for Salazar, the sectorial nature of the ECSC and the demise of the EDC in the French
National Assembly in the summer of 1954 appeared to vindicate his decision to
maintain “a prudent reserve in the face of these experiences (…) contrary to our fundamental
principles”. 10 In January 1956, Salazar still considered that there were “definite
disadvantages” in European integration compared to the traditional nation-state
and that, in a clear reference to France, “some nations appeared to be fatigued of their
existence as independent nations”. 11
II. Portugal, the EEC and EFTA, 1957-61
The signing of the Treaty of Rome exposed the misjudgement in Salazar’s thinking that
“nothing in European politics is of significant interest to us”, that there were “limits [to the
policy] of European co-operation”, and that the Portuguese economy should be under
“national command”. 12 Actually, the establishment of a customs union was to have a profound
effect on Portugal's foreign trade. 13 This was a reality accepted by the Portuguese
Cabinet, and graphically described by the Foreign minister, Paulo Cunha, when stating
that “economic isolation could lead us (…)to an economic catastrophe [and] other [internal]
difficulties could ensue, capable of profoundly affecting the future of the Nation”. 14
In the summer of 1957, Budget junior minister Corrêa d’Oliveira informed the Cabinet
that “if we are placed in a position of isolation [from the British-proposed free trade area
(FTA), this would mean] such a loss in our export trade as to affect our social peace and
9. “Circular sobre sobre integração europeia”, op.cit., pp.61 & 64.
10. A. SALAZAR, Discursos e Notas Políticas, 1951-1958, 5th vol., Lisbon, 1959, “VII – O Plano do
Fomento”, speech of 28 May 1953, p.121.
11. Ibid., “XVIII – Governo e política”, speech of 19 January 1956, pp.318-320.
12. ”Circular sobre sobre integração europeia”, op.cit., p.64.
13. The debate on how Portugal perceived and reacted to the creation of the EEC is largely absent from
the literature. The exceptions are, J.D. ROSAS, O Movimento Económico Europeu: suas incidências
na economia portuguesa, Lisbon, 1957; L.T. PINTO, Portugal e a Integração Económica
Europeia, Lisbon, 1957 and A. POLICARPO and N. JÚNIOR, A economia portuguesa (metropolitana
e ultramarina) perante o movimento de integração económica europeia, in: Económica
Lusitânia, no.12(October-December 1958), pp.43–86.
14. PCM, Estado Novo, CMCE, NP 4, SUM 57/5, 29 March 1957, p.5.