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110 Ziya Önis with the Ankara Agreement. 7 One could go even further and argue that there appeared to be no substantive difference adopted by the Community towards its two major Mediterranean allies. There was no basic disagreement with the view that, given Turkey’s level of industrial development at the time, entry into a full customs union would necessitate a considerable period of protectionism and adaptation. In any case, the eventual promise of a Customs Union through a legally binding Ankara Agreement was interpreted as being essentially the same as full membership in a Community which in the early stages of its development was a loosely structured economic entity involving a customs union and free mobility of labour. III. The Mediterranean Enlargement and Turkey's Self-Exclusion The year 1974 proved to be a critical turning point in Turkey’s relations with the European Community. It was also the beginning of a marked divergence in the fortunes of the two eastern Mediterranean powers, which had enjoyed broadly similar standing within the Community during the earlier era. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 followed by the delegitimation and collapse of the military government in Greece, which had been in power since 1968, involved far-reaching changes in Turkish-Greek-EC relations. The new Greek government under the premiership of Constantine Karamanlis applied for full-membership of the Community in 1975. Ultimately, the Greek application was motivated by political and security considerations as opposed to purely economic concerns. The new Greek government saw full-membership as a means of consolidating the nascent democratic regime in Greece and also as a way of containing the security threat from Turkey, which appeared to be particularly acute following the Cyprus intervention. It is interesting that the early reception of the Greek application within the Community was quite negative. The early Commission reports on the Greek application drew attention not only to the weaknesses of the Greek economy but also, perhaps ironically, to the possible discrimination that Greek membership would entail for the other associate member, Turkey, whose relations with the Community had been on equal terms up to that point. Nonetheless, the negative attitude and lack of optimism were subsequently reversed as the European Council overruled the Commission’s recommendation and decided to open negotiations for full-membership with Greece. The key argument in favour of this decision was that incorpo- 7. During the 1960s and 1970s the main source of contention among politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen in Turkey concerned the precise timing of the Customs Union. In retrospect, an underlying consensus could be detected involving both the right and left of the political spectrum that there ought to be a significant transition period before Turkish industry would become mature and be able to compete with the Community on equal terms. For a thorough documentation of the debates concerning Turkey-EC relations in domestic political and business circles in Turkey see I. TEKELI and S. ILKIN, Türkiye ve Avrupa Toplulug˘u, vol.I, op.cit.
Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective 111 ration into the Community would help to consolidate the fragile democratic regime in Greece. 8 Following the completion of a comparatively short transition period Greece was absorbed as the tenth member of the Community in 1981. Indeed, the time period between Greece’s application and actual accession as a full member proved to be much shorter than the time period which Spain and Portugal had taken to graduate to full member status in the Community. From a historical point of view, one of the puzzles of the late 1970s is why Turkey has failed to apply for full membership of the EC at the same time as Greece, considering that one of the motives for Turkey’s application for associate membership back in 1959 was precisely to counteract the initial strategic move on the part of Greece. In retrospect, a number of possible factors might be identified to explain the puzzle. Firstly, the Turkish policy makers appear to have underestimated the difficulties that Greece’s inclusion in the Community would pose for the subsequent course of Turkey-EC relations. The anticipation was that Greece would be incorporated as a weak and peripheral member and its position would be quite marginal within the overall hierarchy of the Community. Furthermore, the Community itself would refrain from taking decisions against an important NATO power and, at any rate, the inclusion of Greece would not fundamentally alter the Community’s basic stance towards Turkey. Secondly, the Turkish policy makers failed to anticipate the speed whereby the Greek application for full-membership would be realised, a position which appeared to be quite justified by the lack of enthusiasm and the absence of any real momentum during the initial phases of the Greek application. Thirdly, the Turkish political elites, again a reflection of the defensive attitude which they had adopted towards the EC in economic terms, were reluctant to accelerate the pace of integration and to expose Turkish industry to unnecessary and premature competition. In retrospect, what they had in mind was to complete the time table which had been set to them by the Ankara Agreement and the subsequent Additional Protocol based on the understanding that Greece’s peripheral presence as an insider would not jeopardise Turkey’s direct economic links with the Community. 9 8. On the dynamics of Greece's incorporation involving an initial lack of enthusiasm which is subsequently reversed see L. TSOUKALIS, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London, 1981, and I.S. TSALICOGLOU, Negotiating for Entry. The Accession of Greece to the European Community, Aldershot, 1995. On the negative attitude underlying the European Commission's approach to Greece's full membership see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Opinion on Greek Application for Membership (Transmitted to the Council by the Commission on 29 January 1976), in: Bulletin of the European Communities, 1976, Supplement No.2. 9. For an eloquent elaboration of the argument that the Turkish political elites, during the mid-1970s, have severely underestimated the problems which would be posed by Greece's full membership of the Community see S. GÜVENÇ, Turkey's Changing Perception of Greece's Membership in the European Union: 1981-1998, in: Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, No.4(1998/99), pp.103-130. Also relevant in this context is A. ERALP, Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System, in: C. BALKIR and A.M. WILLIAMS (eds.), Turkey and Europe, London, 1993, pp.22-44.
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