journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

20
Maurice FitzGerald
it has been argued here that this was not an exclusive or predestined phenomenon;
indeed, Ireland’s singularity might have as readily been interpreted as being as
troublesome as it was appealing. The reality of this position begs an obvious question:
why was Ireland allowed to join? Whitaker argued in 1962 that “nobody so
loves us as to want us in the EEC on our own terms”. 40 Indeed, why did it thus
become the first peripheral to accede?
The role external and internal influences played cannot be underestimated. During
the course of the 1960s, the Irish government worked very hard to make its case
for membership convincing. However, it was not just a case of Ireland looking to
Europe, as it was also paying full attention to matters closer to home and across the
Irish Sea. As Roy Foster declares, it would indeed be “disingenuous” to argue that
the European continent is more influential than Ireland's closest neighbour. 41 So,
who was responsible for this turnaround in Irish fortunes and who or what were
these powerful influences?
Certainly, Ireland would not have contemplated joining without the UK acceding
as well; in reality, it would not have applied in the first place way back in 1961 if the
latter had not indicated that it was about to do the same. It would have been an “economic
disaster” for it to do otherwise. 42 In the intervening period between initially
applying and finally succeeding, the government had constantly been readying itself,
as well as the rest of the country, for the uncertain vagaries that full EEC membership
implied, while also readily acknowledging and recognising its real and inherent value.
The effects, especially on industry, but also on agriculture, of shifting the Irish
economy from protectionism to liberalisation were to be profound.
In signing the AIFTA agreement in 1965, Ireland clearly demonstrated that it
could compete on an even economic playing field with the UK, at the same time
showing that bilateral Anglo-Irish political relations had finally matured beyond
pubescence. Dublin was even prepared to take a step backwards towards further dependence
on the UK in order to go two steps forward in the direction of interdependence
with Europe. 43 This was readily recognised by the EEC, while confirming
the view in Brussels that – though it might not have been joining as part of some
UK package or addendum – Ireland was only now dealing with the reality of its
40. Whitaker to Jack Lynch (Irish industry & commerce minister), 5 January 1962, NA, D/T,
S16877X/62.
41. R. FOSTER, Paddy and Mr Punch: connections in Irish and English history, London, 1993, pp.31-32.
42. Whitaker to Lynch, 5 January 1962, NA, D/T, S16877X/62.
43. As evidence of this, it is possible to point to a considerable change that took place in Irish trading
patterns. During the years in which Lemass was taoiseach, the average figures for exports to the
UK and the Six were 72.8% and 8.4% respectively; concurrently, import figures became 50.7%
and 14.1%, proof of a significant economic reorientation. In fact, this was an ongoing pattern.
Trade with the EEC increased dramatically in the period after its creation was mooted in 1955,
when 4.4% of Irish goods went in that direction; on the eve of its third set of negotiations at the
end of the 1960s, it stood at 11.3% of exports. In the same period, exports to the UK fell from
89.2% to 65.9%, a significant and ongoing decrease. All data comes from official figures to be
found in CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Ireland: trade and shipping statistics, Dublin,
volume published in 1959, pp.5-10; vol.1969, pp.16-17 and 26-27; and vol.1970, pp.14-15.