journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

100
Hans-Otto Frøland
Even when the Six reached, in January 1962, a compromise on a common agricultural
regulation system, it was difficult for the Norwegian government to calculate the
consequences of Norwegian participation in Community policies prior to the initial application.
In 1967, calculations showed that participation in the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) would result in an immediate income loss of one third. 76 At the end of
1970 Norwegian officials continued to maintain that income would go down, fifty-eight
percent this time. 77
Any Norwegian politician would find the lagging development in income for the
agrarian population unacceptable. Ever since the Free Trade Board submitted its recommendation
for Norwegian negotiations, in 1961, the axiom in all subsequent debates was
that incomes in agriculture should follow the general development of incomes in Norway.
As Section 92 of the Treaty establishing the EEC prohibited national production subsidies
that would distort competition, one would need to edge one's way across this regulation.
On all three occasions the underpinning for the authorities was thus that Norway had to be
included under Sections 39 and 42, which allowed the Council of Ministers to protect agriculture
should structural or natural aspects encounter problems due to the implementation
of a common agricultural policy. Hence, all Norwegian applications reminded Community
officials of Norway's precarious position:
“Norway's accession to the European Economic Community – to quote the Norwegian
letters of application – causes special problems due to the geographical location and economical
structure of the country”. 78
The strategy on all negotiation rounds was to accept the CAP and thus include Norwegian
agriculture in the price schemes of the Community. This would in principle yield the
same market stability as the national regulations. However, as the price level would be
lower while the production subsidies would disappear, permanent permission to retain national
subsidy schemes would be demanded to avoid radical restructuring. When in July
1962 Lange, minister of Foreign affairs, presented the first Norwegian application for
EEC membership to the Council of Ministers, he focused on showing how vulnerable and
behind the times Norway was due to problems given by nature and the climate. 79 This
presentation formed a part in a carefully designed negotiation strategy. The ministry of
76. St.m. No.86, 1966-67, op.cit., p.52.
77. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 9 December 1970, p.6. Discussion of a memorandum on Norwegian
agriculture of 30 November 1970.
78. The letters of application in 1962 and 1967 are printed in “Rapport om De Europeiske Fellesskap.
Fra et utvalg nedsatt av regjeringen 29.mars 1966. Rapport VI. Avgitt 21. april 1971” [Report on
the European Communities by the Board appointed by the Government on 29 March 1966. Report
VI. Submitted on 21 April 1971], Appendix 1 & 2, p.199. The report is enclosed in St.m. 90,
1970-71, “Om Norges forhold til De Europeiske Fellesskap” [On Norway's relation to the European
Communities]. The Board referred to above was the so-called Market Board, which was
established by the non-Socialist coalition government in replacement of the Free Trade Board established
by the Labour government (cf. note 29).
79. UD, 44.36/6.84 vol.14, The Norwegian government's declaration to the European Economic Community,
4 July 1962. To provide the rationale for permanent special schemes for agriculture, Mr
Lange also appealed to contingency planning due to having the Soviet Union for a neighbour. This
had already been used successfully when negotiating bilaterally with the Americans at the time of
the Marshall Plan.