journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

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Nicolau Andresen-Leitão
tory demonstrates that economic integration has led to political integration”. On the
issue of sovereignty, it held a diametrically opposed view to that of Salazar:
“if surrendering economic powers to an organisation of states implies the loss of
political power, nowadays the importance of economy in the life of nations has
become self-evident, [therefore] the issue has to be faced as a contract. We believe
that no country can consider itself to be wounded in its sovereignty, when, freely, it
accepts entry into an organisation which can give it advantages and represents an
instrument of defence against the threat which hangs over the Western World”. 19
Even though this opinion was expressed in Cold War terms, it was a notable
statement, for it ran contrary to Salazar’s private and public statements on European
integration and national sovereignty. Contrarily to the Portuguese administration,
the Oporto Industrial Association had realised that economic growth could
“occupy in the national collective psyche (…) the place formerly occupied by the
growth of national territory”. 20
The breakdown of the FTA negotiations in November 1958 constituted a serious
reverse for the countries that had followed the British lead in seeking to minimise
the consequences of the establishment of the Community. In the particular case of
Portugal, the special FTA status it sought had already been approved by the corresponding
group of experts but had not been discussed by the OEEC inter-governmental
committee dealing with the problems of the FTA (the so-called "Maudling
Committee" after the appointment of Reginald Maudling as its chairman in
mid-November 1957). 21
It was only in July 1959 that Britain and the Scandinavian countries accepted
that Portugal could be a member of EFTA. As they feared that the economic exceptions
which Portugal sought would seem to publicly weaken EFTA vis-à-vis the
EEC, the solution was a gentlemen’s agreement proposed by Trade minister Corrêa
d’Oliveira, whereby the concessions to Portugal would remain confidential until
the signing of the EFTA Convention. 22 In political terms, the negotiations also were
successful for Portugal, considering that Portugal achieved what it had sought from
the start, i.e. not having to negotiate by itself with the Six. Corrêa d’Oliveira reported
to Salazar that in future negotiations between the Six and Seven, which he believed
to be near, “we will be in a guaranteed safe position, because we have the
right of veto”, concluding that “we are among the group of countries which lead
European politics with equal rights without equal obligations”. 23
19. Ibid., p.26.
20. A.S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, 1992, p.41.
21. The status Portugal was about to reach in the FTA negotiations provided the basis for the special
status obtained by Portugal in the EFTA Convention. Under Annex G, Portugal was given double
the time span of other EFTA members to dismantle tariffs and the right to introduce new tariffs to
protect infant industries.
22. ANTT, AOS/CO/EC-17, Pt. 6, telegram, Corrêa d’Oliveira to Salazar, 23 July 1959, p.136.
23. ANTT, AOS/CO/EC-17A, Pt. 4, handwritten comments by Corrêa d’Oliveira to Salazar, dated 6
November 1959, on Guerra's telegram to Comissão Técnica de Cooperação Económica Externa of
2 November, p.186.