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The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports Spain's European Integration Efforts 45
Spanish. The second model was consequently the most realistic: It planned a
two-tier procedure with decisive steps towards a customs union occurring only in a
second stage. For the Spanish the difficulty consisted in the fact, that the transition
from the first to the second level would not occur automatically at all, but only by
mutual consent; moreover in the first stage, the preferential regulations would alone
profit industrial products. Again the Germans tried to put through on behalf of the
Spanish that also the agricultural produce, which constituted such an important part
of Spain’s export trade, could enjoy increasing customs preferences. According to
the mandate, on whose basis the negotiation with Spain started in 1967 and finally
led to the signing of a preferential trade agreement in June 1970, agricultural commodities
were also taken into account in the determination of the preferential customs
duties of the first stage, but only in an extremely limited extent of seven per
cent of the Spanish agricultural exports. Thus obviously German influence was on
the whole rather limited until 1967.
On six occasions the Germans had interceded on behalf of the Spanish after
their original 1962 application for association – with varying degrees of success.
Their striving for a favourable reply had been an outright failure. First, against the
German vote in 1962 a simple acknowledgement of receipt had been decided on,
then in 1964 the Germans, in the course of the campaign for their own draft had to
suffer a downright diplomatic defeat, when the Dutch and the Belgians contrary to
prior arrangement suddenly voted against the German proposal. Certainly the efforts
deployed afterwards were crowned with success, when the possibility of association
at least was not excluded from the beginning and when the exploratory talks
in 1966 were scheduled according to the German proposal.
On the whole two things are striking: first, the results the Germans achieved for
the Spanish were not in the least spectacular, but on the contrary rather modest.
Even the consideration of seven per cent of the Spanish agricultural exports, which
the Federal Government had been able to put through during the 1967 discussion
about a preferential trade agreement could, by no means, come up to Spanish expectations.
The mere fact, that after two further years the rate of the agricultural exports
to be taken into consideration was raised to sixty-three percent, shows how
frankly ridiculous the first quota had been. 34 Particularly as the German commitment
in that precise field was all but selfless, after all the German economy also
benefited from a favourable solution. Secondly, it is conspicuous that German involvement
became perceptible, only when the Spanish explicitly asked for support
beforehand. As a rule, the Germans did react promptly to the Spanish requests, but
obviously never hit on the idea of acting on their own initiative. In 1964, the Germans
even refused the indirectly expressed request of the Spanish to bring an influence
to bear on the exploratory talks, so that from 1964 to 1966 nothing happened
in this issue, until the Spanish again asked for an active commitment.
34. This increase occurred in the course of the second mandate the Council of ministers gave to the
Commission on 17 October 1969. On this basis the negotiations on the preferential trade agreement
progressed quickly. After Spain had been able to obtain concessions on certain points, the agreement
was ready to be signed in June 1970.