journal of european integration history revue d'histoire de l ...

94
Hans-Otto Frøland
The interest for fish exports conflicted with the interest in avoiding agricultural imports.
The Norwegian negotiators therefore actively contributed to and were quite
satisfied when early in 1958 OEEC negotiators segregated the discussions on agriculture
and fisheries. 51 Prior to the break in the FTA negotiations, in November
1958, the minister of Trade was pleased to state that the fisheries scheme appeared
to be no more liberal than Norway would like it to be:
“If we had gone on to demand absolute free trade it would not have been possible to
avoid placing a number of our national Norwegian regulations (…) in the spotlight
immediately”. 52
The authorities gave higher priority to the national regulations of the primary sector
than to fish exports. However, eventually recognising that agriculture could not be
excluded from any agreement, the government primarily sought to gain understanding
for bilateral special schemes that would have the greatest possible protective
effect. In April 1958 the government had agreed to a Swedish initiative for a
separate Scandinavian plan that accepted the EEC definition of agricultural produce
(Annex II of the Treaty establishing the EEC), with the exception of some fish
goods. The plan established via bilateral contingencies a minimum-price system
corresponding to the aim of the EEC Treaty. 53 In the autumn of 1958 the Norwegian
government was also inclined to accept a time schedule for introducing multilateral
regulation.
This proves that some groups in the government were willing to restructure agriculture.
Some believed that agricultural protection could not be defended if impeding
participation in the European free trade area, and that the agricultural policy
had become too inflationary anyway. However, resistance against a change remained
strong within the government itself, as well as in parliament and, no doubt,
among agricultural organisations. Agricultural organisations wanted to set the minimum-price
scheme of the Scandinavian plan at a level that would not force radical
changes. Had a FTA treaty comprising agriculture been negotiated, a strong domestic
opposition would have occurred. Referring to an inter-Scandinavian report from
1957 that argued in favour of a Nordic common market which covered eighty per
cent of intra-Scandinavian trade while simultaneously omitting agriculture, opponents
would have obviously battled in favour of a pure Nordic solution. 54
However, as the EEC was a reality, the establishment of EFTA eventually became
the best solution. 55 Norway belonged to the majority group among the Seven
51. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 27 February 1958, p.6.
52. SA, SUUKK, Minutes of 5 November 1958, p.8.
53. UD, 44.33/13 vol. 2, Report from a Scandinavian meeting in Copenhagen, 18 April 1958; and SA,
SUUKK, Minutes of 5 November 1958, p.7.
54. The most stimulating interpretation of the discussions on a Nordic preference area in the 1950s is
V. SØRENSEN, Nordic Cooperation. A Social Democratic Alternative to Europe, in: T.B.
OLESEN (ed.), Interdependence versus integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe,
1945-1960, Odense 1995, pp.40-61.
55. On the EFTA negotiations, cf. J. LAURSEN and M. af MALMBORG, The Creation of EFTA, in:
T.B. OLESEN, op.cit., pp.197-212.