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18 Maurice FitzGerald by the Council to the effect that the Six had decided unanimously to accede to Ireland’s entreaty to open accession negotiations. 28 The fact that the UK's application for membership was vetoed by Charles de Gaulle, the French president, less than three months later effectively meant that Irish efforts were somewhat in vain. Nonetheless, in the intervening eighteen months between its decision to apply for full membership and the UK's exclusion, the Dublin government had at least been preparing itself and the general population – specifically Irish agriculture and industry – for the exigencies that membership would require. With the prospect of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) there were obvious market benefits for the farming community, explaining why the National Farmers' Association and the agricultural lobby were so in favour of membership, but achieving greater efficiency and higher production levels was proving to be a problem. The opening up of the traditional UK agricultural market to European competition would mean that imaginative enterprise and rapid adaptation was required if Irish farmers and exporters were to be successful, something Lemass was keen to stress. 29 However, if the situation facing agriculture presented an opportunity, the future for industry could be seen as a threat. 30 It was readily apparent that indigenous Irish industry was going to have to adapt or fail especially as it was felt that accession would be achieved by the end of the decade, the promulgation of “membership by 1970” a constant refrain. 31 It was a case of modernising or dying and the taoiseach was quick to emphasise the need to adapt to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the industrial lobby. 32 It was clear that the car assembly industry and textile production would suffer when their places in Ireland's protected economy were exposed to the realities of liberalised trade. However, efficient industries, especially those benefiting from foreign direct investment, would prosper with the result that the gains to Irish industry from full EEC membership would outweigh the losses. 33 Essentially, Ireland was unable to join the EEC in 1963 because it was not possible for it to do so on its own. It was too economically dependent on the UK. Ireland's application was effectively tied to the fortunes of its neighbour. This was despite all declarations to the contrary. 34 If that was not the case, it could still have 28. Emilio Colombo (EEC Council president) to Lemass, 23 October 1962, NA, D/T, S17339/62. 29. Lemass to Juan Greene (National Farmers' Association president), 13 July 1961, NA, D/T, S16877M/61. 30. Matthew McCloskey (US ambassador, Dublin) to John F. Kennedy (US president), 14 September 1962, John F. Kennedy presidential library, Boston (JFK), Kennedy Papers (KP), NSC Box#18. 31. Lemass interview with the Irish Independent, 23 April 1965, NA, D/T, S17427Q. 32. D/T memorandum on a meeting held on 11 July 1961 between Lemass and a deputation from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 14 July 1961, NA, D/T, S16877N/61. 33. McCloskey to Kennedy, 14 September 1962, JFK, KP, NSC Box#18. 34. Lemass speaking at a press conference, 5 September 1962, as quoted in D. J. MAHER, op.cit., p.158. In fact, the taoiseach admitted as much when he said: “a failure of the British negotiations would require us to reconsider our position in the light of the circumstances which may then prevail”. Lemass speech to the Cork Chamber of Commerce, 15 November 1962, NA, D/T, S17389/ 62Annex.
Ireland's Relations With the EEC: From the Treaties of Rome to Membership 19 joined independently of London; indeed, the taoiseach had previously reassured the French president that Ireland wanted to enter whether or not the UK itself ultimately adhered. 35 It can be assumed that, just like the Danes, there were limited overtures for Ireland to press on with its application, but it was incapable of so doing. The “feasibility” of full membership had been considered. 36 But, without the UK's accession, it was not yet possible to join for economic reasons, though it was clear that the time would come. Excluded from EFTA four years earlier, Dublin subsequently realised that this was not necessarily a bad thing. It was quite sure however that it eventually wanted Ireland to join the EEC. There were considerable domestic reasons why Ireland was being encouraged to take part in the European integration process, including parliamentary support and the lobbying done by informative pressure groups such as the Irish Council of the European Movement chaired by Garret FitzGerald, a respected economic and political commentator. 37 Obviously, there were external considerations as well, ranging from the support of the United States (US) for British and Irish entry to an understanding in London that the UK could not stand in Ireland's way. 38 Ostensibly, there was also support from the Six, even if the institutions themselves were not always convinced of the propensity of such a move. 39 Ultimately, the decision lay with the Irish government and it was convinced that membership would be good for the country. Third time lucky At the third time of asking, Ireland managed to join the EEC, along with Denmark and the UK – the Norwegians demurring – during the first wave of enlargement in 1973. In some respects, partly because it was a peripheral, its entry was unique, but 35. Pierson Dixon (UK ambassador, Paris) to the Foreign Office, 17 October 1962, PRO, FO, 371/ 164772; Dixon to the Foreign Office, 19 October 1962, PRO, FO, 371/164772. 36. Lemass to Seán MacBride (former Irish foreign minister), 7 May 1963, NA, D/T, S174227G/63; MacBride to Lemass, 10 June 1963, NA, D/T, S17427G/63; Lemass to MacBride, 13 June 1963, NA, D/T, S17427G/63. 37. Garret FitzGerald (Irish Council of the European Movement chairman) to Whitaker, 29 April 1961, NA, D/T, S16023C/61. Of course, this supplemented the information that the government was receiving from diplomatic sources, but there is little evidence to suggest that this lobby group was particularly influential. 38. Clearly, the US was particularly interested in the UK joining the EEC but, because Ireland had applied for full and not associate membership, it enjoyed a strong degree of US support as well. Mc- Closkey to Kennedy, 14 September 1962, JFK, KP, NSC Box#18. At times, the UK's view of Ireland was more ambiguous and self-interested; indeed, surreptitious attempts to dissuade its attempted entry were made. Roderick Barclay (UK foreign office official) minutes, 18 & 21 July 1961, PRO, FO, 371/158220; Cremin memorandum, 26 July 1961, NA, D/T, S16877N/61. 39. Florence O'Riordan (Irish chargé d'affaires ad interim, The Hague) report, 11 August 1961, NA, D/T, S16877O/61; S. TOSCHI, Washington – London – Paris: an Untenable Triangle (1960-1963), in: Journal of European Integration History, vol.1/2(1995), pp.81-109.
Page 1 and 2: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
Page 7 and 8: INTRODUCTION Fernando Guirao The hi
Page 9 and 10: Introduction 7 had become accustome
Page 11: Introduction 9 strengthening the an
Page 14 and 15: 12 Maurice FitzGerald endorsed by a
Page 16 and 17: 14 Maurice FitzGerald Ireland in a
Page 18 and 19: 16 Maurice FitzGerald Relations wit
Page 22 and 23: 20 Maurice FitzGerald it has been a
Page 24 and 25: 22 Maurice FitzGerald application t
Page 26 and 27: 24 Maurice FitzGerald position. It
Page 28 and 29: 26 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão researc
Page 30 and 31: 28 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão Communi
Page 32 and 33: 30 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão tory de
Page 34 and 35: 32 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão the int
Page 36 and 37: 34 Nicolau Andresen-Leitão as a ri
Page 39 and 40: The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports
Page 53: The Reliable Ally: Germany Supports
Page 56 and 57: 54 Tapani Paavonen least nominally
Page 58 and 59: 56 Tapani Paavonen was usually not
Page 60 and 61: 58 Tapani Paavonen selainen announc
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Page 64 and 65: 62 Tapani Paavonen did not react pu
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68 Tapani Paavonen Finland should p
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70 Tapani Paavonen majority of the
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72 Tapani Paavonen trademark of Fin
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74 Tapani Paavonen trade policies,
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Choosing the Periphery: The Politic
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Choosing the Periphery 79 Norway wa
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Choosing the Periphery 81 to this p
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Choosing the Periphery 83 rates. Ad
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Choosing the Periphery 85 gain of s
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Choosing the Periphery 87 economy d
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Choosing the Periphery 89 modernisa
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Choosing the Periphery 95 rejecting
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Choosing the Periphery 97 Norwegian
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Choosing the Periphery 99 Being awa
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Choosing the Periphery 101 Foreign
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Choosing the Periphery 103 felt tow
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106 Ziya Önis I. Turkey and the Co
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108 Ziya Önis necessitated a democ
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110 Ziya Önis with the Ankara Agre
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112 Ziya Önis By the late 1970s, h
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114 Ziya Önis by the beginning of
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116 Ziya Önis the official EU assi
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118 Ziya Önis Concluding Observati
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Book reviews - Comptes rendus - Buc
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Abstracts - Résumés - Zusammenfas
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Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren 14
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146 Books received - Livres reçus
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