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Choosing the Periphery 95
rejecting further talks after France blocked the FTA negotiations in November
1958. In the spring of 1959, during the negotiations leading to the creation of
EFTA, British attempts at excluding the paper industry were defeated. This eliminated
the only threat against Norway's export interests. Norway also attempted to
bargain for more favourable regulations to encourage capital import, but this was
not successful. Admittedly, it was reputed that Switzerland and Great Britain would
allow easier access to their respective capital markets, but these admissions were
not really binding. As France was then unable to demand regulations that would
hamper Norwegian exports, Norway chose to defend the domestic industry to a
greater extent.
Concerning the domestic market, the textile industry was in particular in need
of protection. The government succeeded in negotiating décalage for some goods.
In cases where tariff rates were not bound by GATT agreements, the rates for some
goods were raised before the base date for the introduction of tariff reductions.
Norway exploited Great Britain's need to establish a negotiation cartel and obtained
better terms for fish exports on the British market. 56 The Stockholm convention at
the same time excluded agriculture. Nor did it force a change of domestic investment
policy, which, needless to say, was a condition for the restructuring of the domestic
industry. In view of the political economy, EFTA was thus the ideal solution
for Norway. Only the Communist party representative in parliament voted against
the Stockholm convention. Resistance in industry was contained by the Industrial
Association, but also through special restructuring measures and tax reductions introduced
by the government.
The perception of EFTA as being a better policy option for Norway than EEC was
strengthened because it rapidly appeared that a majority of the industry successfully restructured
to compete under EFTA regulations. Early in the 1960s, the authorities recognised that
throughout the 1950s they had worried inordinately about the domestic industry. It was admittedly
difficult on the psychological plane to accelerate the tariff reduction plan in EFTA,
such as favoured by the British in the spring of 1963. At a meeting with Sir Edward Heath,
the then Norwegian ambassador in London and former minister of Trade, Arne Skaug, stated
that an acceleration decision in EFTA “would create a most unhappy decision”. 57 The
Norwegian attempt to invoke décalage at EFTA's Council meeting in Lisbon was weak,
however, and unsuccessful. The argument to shield traditional domestic industry gradually
faded away and played no significant role through the 1960s. Therefore Norwegian governments
continued to support EFTA's goal of tariff harmonisation and bridge building with the
Community. The fact that problems did not crop up influenced discussions on Norwegian
membership in the Community throughout the 1960s. The Labour government could exploit
the argument fully in the white paper presented to support the accession treaty in 1972.
According to the paper, Norway aimed at “access to stable and as unrestricted markets in
other countries as possible”; at the same time it was assured that “domestic industry” was to
56. R.T. GRIFFITHS, The Importance of Fish for the Creation of EFTA, in: EFTA Bulletin, No.1,
1992, pp.34-40.
57. Public Record Office, London (PRO), Board of Trade files, 241/775, Record of a conversation between
the Norwegian Ambassador and Lord Privy Seal, 25 March 1963.